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ABSTRACT 
   
Existing work suggests that intergroup negativity is caused by dissimilarities of values 
between groups. In contrast, I propose that incompatible values--regardless of whether 
they are similar or dissimilar--cause intergroup negativities. Because values act as cues to 
tangible goals and interests, groups' values suggest desired outcomes that may conflict 
with our own (i.e., incompatible values). The current study conceptually and empirically 
disentangles value-dissimilarity and value-incompatibility, which were confounded in 
previous research. Results indicated that intergroup negativities were strongly predicted 
by value-incompatibility, and only weakly and inconsistently predicted by value-
dissimilarity. I further predicted that groups' values cue specific threats and opportunities 
to perceivers and that, in reaction to these inferred affordances, people will experience 
threat-relevant, specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, disgust); however, results did 
not support this prediction. I also predicted that, because the inferred threats that groups 
pose to one another are not always symmetric, the negativities between groups may 
sometimes be asymmetric (i.e., Group A feels negatively toward Group B, but Group B 
feels neutral or positively toward Group A). This prediction received strong support. In 
sum, reframing our understanding of values as cues to conflicts-of-interest between 
groups provides principles for understanding intergroup prejudices in more nuanced 
ways. 
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Values, Goals, and Threat: 
Value Incompatibilities—More Than Dissimilarities—Predict Prejudices 
 In December 2014, numerous flights to Israel were delayed when ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish male passengers refused to sit next to unrelated female passengers, asking that the 
women relocate to other seats. More recently, a protest in front of the US Supreme Court 
divided a family, with a son protesting in favor of same-sex marriage while his father 
protested in opposition. From the Berlin Wall to the Western Wall, from MLK marching 
in DC to the KKK marching in Skokie, everything from peaceful protests to international 
wars have been started in the name of “values.” 
Existing empirical work reveals a rather simple relationship between values and 
intergroup prejudices, suggesting that intergroup antagonism is caused by perceived 
dissimilarities in values between groups. For example, people rate targets with inferred 
dissimilar values more negatively than those with similar values (e.g., Rokeach & Mezei, 
1966; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Chambers, Schlenker, 
& Collisson, 2013; Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). Whereas 
previous research suggests that intergroup antagonism emerges when members of one 
group believe that members of another group have dissimilar values, I propose instead 
that it emerges when members of one group believe that members of another group hold 
values that are potentially incompatible with their own—that is, values that imply conflict 
over goals and interests.1 
                                                 
1 Many authors use the term “incongruent” to reference the degree of dissimilarity 
between individuals’ or groups’ beliefs or values (e.g., Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Biernat, 
Vescio, & Theno, 1996). While “incongruent” is semantically similar to “incompatible”, 
these authors defined and generally operationalized “incongruent” as “dissimilar.” 
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Specifically, group values (or morals, or other standards of behavior) shape group 
actions (Schwartz, 1996), and these actions potentially create conflicts of interest with 
other groups. For example, some Orthodox Jews value gender segregation among 
unrelated individuals, leading them to avoid sitting next to unrelated women on a plane, 
which can conflict with female passengers’ desire to remain in their preferred seats. A 
group’s values can thus be used as a cue to their potential behaviors and, therefore, allow 
inferences that the group may hinder one’s own desired behaviors. In this way, because 
negative prejudices and discrimination are likely to result from actual conflicts of interest 
between groups (Sherif, 1966; Jackson, 2013), groups perceived to hold incompatible 
values may elicit negative prejudices and discrimination. 
 The existing research linking values and intergroup antagonism has focused on 
cross-group value-pairings that confound dissimilarity and incompatibility. But, similar 
values across groups are sometimes incompatible and dissimilar values are sometimes 
compatible (i.e., complementary with, potentially facilitative of, and/or simply not 
hindering each other’s goals). For example, if Group A and Group B both value power 
(i.e., have similar values), they each threaten the others’ interests, given that power is 
relative and, therefore, power gained by one is lost by the other. Consider, alternatively, 
that Group A values achievement and Group B values humility (i.e., they hold dissimilar 
values); the achievement-valuing group would be unconcerned about the humility-
valuing group attempting to “steal the spotlight”, and the humility-valuing group would 
be equally unconcerned about the achievement-valuing group attempting to drag them 
into the spotlight. In this situation, each group’s likely behaviors do not threaten the goals 
of the other group, thus creating compatibility (i.e., no conflict of interest). 
  3 
In the current paper, I aim to conceptually and empirically disentangle cross-
group value-dissimilarity and value-incompatibility, thereby enabling a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of values in creating intergroup prejudices (i.e., emotional 
reactions toward groups and their members). I make the following general predictions: 
(1) Across groups, some pairings of similar values are incompatible; one would expect 
this value-incompatibility to elicit negative prejudices between the groups. (2) Across 
groups, some pairings of dissimilar values are compatible; one would expect this value-
compatibility to elicit neutral or positive prejudices between the groups. (3) Whereas one 
group may see a value-pairing as incompatible, the other group may not; one would thus 
expect these pairings to lead to asymmetries in prejudices, (e.g., Group A feels positively 
toward Group B, but Group B feels negatively toward Group A). And (4) cross-group 
value-pairs are not all compatible or incompatible in the same way and with the same 
implications; because different pairings of values constitute different threats and 
opportunities to each group, they are likely to elicit qualitatively distinct emotional 
reactions. 
In sum, I propose that we change the values-prejudice conceptualization: Rather 
than focusing on the idea that intergroup negativity can emerge from perceived value-
dissimilarities between groups, we would benefit by instead focusing on the idea that 
intergroup negativity can emerge from perceived conflicts of interest between groups, as 
cued by value-incompatibility. In all, my framework generates novel, nuanced 
predictions about the roles that values and other behavioral standards play in shaping 
intergroup relations, thereby extending the field’s current understanding of values-based 
prejudices. 
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Values and Intergroup Negativity: Previous Findings 
 Decades of research demonstrate that, across groups, inferred dissimilarities in 
values predict increased intergroup hostility (e.g., Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Mezei, 
1966; Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2007; 
Garcia-Retamero, Muller, & Rousseau, 2012). Rokeach’s (1960) formative work 
proposed that we feel negatively toward beliefs (i.e., attitudes, values), and people who 
exhibit such beliefs, in proportion to their degree of incongruence (i.e., relative 
dissimilarity and/or unimportance) to our own beliefs. Indeed, both the salience of one’s 
own group’s values and the inferred dissimilarity of another groups’ values matter when 
predicting intergroup negativity: both prejudices and intergroup discrimination increase 
as the inferred dissimilarity of an outgroup’s values increases, and this relationship 
becomes stronger as the salience of the ingroup’s values increases (i.e., when the 
ingroup’s values are more infused into everyday public activities) (Neuberg et al., 2014). 
An extension of Rokeach’s (1960) theorizing was that racial prejudice—per se—
does not exist. Rather, people use race as a cue to others’ beliefs and infer that racial 
outgroup members have incongruent beliefs, thus resulting in what appear to be racial 
prejudices. Much work supports the predictions that (1) target group membership is used 
as a cue to value-dissimilarity and (2) above and beyond target group membership, 
targets inferred to have dissimilar values elicit greater negativity than those inferred to 
have similar values; such effects have been demonstrated for a wide variety of target 
groups (e.g., racial, political, religious) and hold even when rating ingroup members (e.g., 
Biernat et al., 1996a; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Chambers et al., 2013; Rokeach & 
Mezei, 1966; Brandt et al., 2014; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). In addition, 
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individuals’ expectations of negativity or threat directed toward their ingroup by 
outgroups also increases as the inferred dissimilarity of the outgroups’ values increases 
(Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2012).  
 My approach differs from those above in that I argue that dissimilar values 
between groups will not always result in intergroup negativity, nor will similar values 
always result in intergroup positivity. In the current manuscript, for the sake of clarity 
and simplicity, I use the term “values” as an encompassing term meaning “standards of 
behavior” (i.e., beliefs about desirable ways of behaving); such terminology generally 
reflects existing definitions of related constructs (e.g., “values”, “morals”) as standards of 
behavior that regulate and guide one’s behavior (with morality focusing more clearly on 
interpersonal behavior) (see Schwartz, 1994 for a definition of values; see Killen & 
Smetana, 2013, and Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, for definitions of morality/moral systems). 
Overall, I argue that inferences of other groups’ values—sometimes dissimilar, but 
sometimes similar—drive prejudices because values act as cues to people’s goals and 
potential behaviors and, therefore, to potential conflicts of interest. For example, 
individuals who value progressive social roles (e.g., those in favor of women working 
outside the home) may infer that those who value traditional social roles (e.g., in 
opposition to women working outside the home) will attempt to impose undesirable 
constraints on women’s behavior. When one person’s (or group’s) desired actions or 
outcomes hinder another person’s (or group’s) desired actions or outcomes, I refer to this 
as a “conflict of interest.” 
My approach also differs from existing work in that I argue that cross-group 
value-incompatibility represents a tangible threat rather than a “symbolic threat”. Some 
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existing work differentiates between intergroup negativity caused by realistic, tangible 
potential conflicts (e.g., threats to a group’s resources, power, welfare) and symbolic 
conflicts (e.g., threats to a group’s belief system, morality, worldview) (Stephan et al., 
2007; Jackson, 2013). I assert that apparent “symbolic” conflicts are, at their core, 
realistic. To the extent that values act as a semi-reliable cue to others’ goals and potential 
behaviors, values that imply conflicting goals and behaviors represent a realistic—not 
symbolic—conflict. For example, if one person values egalitarianism and another values 
meritocracy, although this reflects a difference in their abstract valuations of “fairness”, it 
also suggests differences in their likelihood to support affirmative action policies; those 
valuing meritocracy may view affirmative action as limiting their personal opportunities 
for advancement, illustrating that seemingly “abstract” values translate into realistic 
conflicts. To explicate how cross-group values act as cues to potential conflicts of 
interest, I briefly discuss the role of threat-detection and threat-management systems in 
human social life, followed by a demonstration of how values can act as cues to potential 
threats and opportunities. 
Values as Cues to Threats and Opportunities 
The ecological approach to perception argues that many of the ways we perceive 
and interact with our environments—including our social environments—serve adaptive 
functions, maximizing reproductive success for those organisms who most successfully 
navigate and manage the affordances (i.e., threats and opportunities) present in their 
environments (e.g., McArthur & Baron, 1983; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008; Neuberg, 
Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011). In general, living in interdependent social groups increases 
reproductive fitness by allowing individuals to accomplish goals that would be 
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impossible to accomplish alone. However, living in close proximity to other humans also 
exposes one to great risks, including physical violence, contagious disease, and loss of 
resources (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008; Neuberg et al., 2011). 
Because of the potentially high costs (e.g., death, failure to pass along one’s 
genes) of failing to notice a threat or opportunity, humans became highly adept at 
identifying features of other humans that indicate they may present such affordances 
(Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). Often, the most direct cues 
to others’ affordances are their behaviors (e.g., witnessing someone stealing). However, 
given the size of modern human social groups, we often have incomplete information 
regarding others’ behaviors. Therefore, in order to infer others’ likely behaviors toward 
us, we must often use indirect indications of their likely behaviors (i.e., cues). Some cues 
to the potential threats and opportunities others pose to us are based on appearance. For 
example, masculine facial features can serve as a cue to testosterone levels and, therefore, 
aggressive tendencies (Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett, & Penke, 2013). Importantly, such cues 
are imperfect; not all men with very masculine features will act aggressively. 
Nonetheless, it is more likely that, all else equal, a man with strongly masculine features 
will act more aggressively than a man with less masculine features, and some information 
about a target’s probable affordances is better than no information. 
 I suggest that people’s values can also act as cues to their affordances, given that 
values provide information about people’s likely behaviors. For example, imagine that 
you see two people, each wearing a t-shirt displaying one of the images below (Figures 1 
and 2). What might you assume about each of these people? If you’re like me, you might 
assume that the wearer of Figure 1 values peace and tolerance, whereas the wearer of 
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Figure 2 values dominance and aggression. You might extend this logic to make 
assumptions about their likely behaviors, conjecturing that #1 is more likely to donate 
money to the World Peace Organization and #2 is more likely to donate money to the 
National Rifle Association, that #1 is more likely to participate in a sit-in and #2 is more 
likely to participate in a riot, and that #1 is more likely to harbor refugees and #2 is more 
likely to guard against them. People’s espoused or implied values give us (imperfect) 
information about their motivations, goals, and behaviors, and, therefore, act as cues to 
the potential threats and opportunities they pose to us. 
Given that others’ values cue the behaviors they may direct toward us, values also 
act as cues to potential conflicts of interest between groups. Some conflicts of interest 
arise when two groups have dissimilar goals, as cued by their dissimilar values. For 
example, if Group A values equality, we might presume that Group A’s members would 
vote to allow same-sex marriage, whereas if Group B values traditional gender roles, we 
might presume that Group B’s members would vote to prohibit same-sex marriage. In 
this instance, dissimilar values represent opposing, mutually exclusive goals. In contrast, 
a conflict of interest can also arise when two groups have the same goal, as cued by their 
similar values. For example, if Fraternity A and Fraternity B both value status and 
compete to be the most popular fraternity, any status gained by Fraternity A is lost, at 
least relatively, by Fraternity B. Although Fraternities A and B have the same value, their 
desired actions and outcomes hinder each other. In this way, intergroup negativity does 
not result from value dissimilarity, per se, but rather from conflicts of interest, which can 
be cued by dissimilar or similar values. 
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If values act as cues to peoples’ goals and behaviors, understanding the content of 
peoples’ values is necessary to know whether these values are compatible or 
incompatible and derive predictions about potential conflicts of interest. Theories 
concerning the function and content of values, morals, and motivations are diverse, 
although they also produce many overlapping predictions. Here, for the sake of brevity, I 
merely cite those perspectives that make clear predictions concerning the content of 
people’s values (i.e., standards of behavior); this is by no means an exhaustive review of 
such literature. And, the predictions I later derive are applicable to all standards of 
behavior, not only those represented by the perspectives cited here. 
Many standards of behavior stem from basic human needs and desires, reflecting 
implicit, fundamental motives that aid in human survival and reproductive success (e.g., 
gain status, find and retain mates) and/or basic tenets that enhance the smoothness and 
efficiency of human coalitional living (e.g., do not harm one’s ingroup) (Kenrick, 
Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010; Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Schaller, & 
Becker, 2010; Neuberg et al., 2000). Such implicit norms often evolve into more 
formalized systems of morals and values, many of which focus on harm-based 
conceptions of morality (e.g., Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). More domain-specific 
perspectives of values and moral systems include work on the “three ethics” (e.g., 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Graham, et al., 2011; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), the 
Model of Moral Motives (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013), morality as relationship 
regulation (e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011; Rai & Fiske, 2012), and Schwartz’s (1994; 2012) 
theory of basic values (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012). Once we understand the content of a 
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group’s values, we can predict which values are likely compatible or incompatible, and 
the specific emotional, prejudiced reactions to such potential conflicts. 
Value Incompatibilities and Potential Conflicts of Interest 
Assumptions 
 A few assumptions underlie the following predictions. First, any conflict of 
interest requires that the involved parties be seen as able to influence one another’s goals, 
outcomes, or behaviors. If one group has values that imply a potential conflict of interest 
with another group, but this group is seen as unable to hinder, constrain, or provide 
opportunities to the other (e.g., due to physical distance or a lack of power), there will be 
no perceived conflict. 
 Second, values are conceptualized at levels ranging from abstract, with few 
specific behaviors implied (e.g., comply with social roles) to more concrete, with more 
specific behaviors implied (e.g., protect the self from contagious disease). As cues to 
potential conflicts of interest, values are most useful at the level closest to predicting 
specific behaviors; as such, many standards of behavior that are generally conceptualized 
as attitudes (e.g., people should not have abortions) will be more useful for predicting 
conflicts of interest than the broader associated values (e.g., people should value life). 
However, in the absence of more specific attitude information, broad values can still be 
used to infer potential conflicts of interest. 
Prediction I: Similar Values are not Always Compatible 
Across groups, if similar values suggest goals, desired outcomes, or behaviors that 
would hinder (i.e., conflict with) each other, this will result in a conflict of interest. Goals 
related to obtaining limited resources (e.g., material goods, status and power, desirable 
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mates) tend to be similar but incompatible because, if both parties want the same limited 
resource, they generally cannot both have it. Again, for example, if Group A and Group 
B both value power, their members are motivated to dominate each other and control 
each other’s outcomes, resulting in a conflict of interest. However, the actual outcome of 
such a conflict may vary based on other factors (e.g., if the groups are equal in power, 
they may reach a stalemate; if one group is more powerful than the other, the high-power 
group may successfully aggress against the low-power group). Regardless of such 
factors, each party potentially hinders the other’s goals, resulting in a conflict of interest. 
Prediction II: Dissimilar Values are not Always Incompatible 
Across groups, dissimilar values are often assumed to lead to negative prejudices. 
From my perspective, however, dissimilar values that suggest goals, desired outcomes, or 
behaviors that facilitate or complement each other create no conflict of interest, and thus 
no negative prejudice. For example, if Group A values tolerance and open-mindedness, 
its members are likely motivated to learn about and accept others’ points of view. If 
Group B values insularity (i.e., focusing on one’s own community, avoiding contact with 
those outside the community), its members are motivated to avoid learning about others’ 
points of view. Although these groups’ values are dissimilar, they do not suggest a 
conflict of interest. Group A, being motivated to accept Group B’s desire for solitude, 
would likely leave Group B alone. Group B, being motivated to avoid Group A, would 
leave Group A alone. In this instance, neither party would hinder each other’s goals, 
resulting in no conflict of interest. 
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Prediction III: Conflicts of Interest are Sometimes Asymmetric 
 In the example where Group A and B both value power, each group would view 
the other as presenting the same threat (i.e., potential violence and/or loss of power); this 
represents a symmetric conflict. However, there can also be asymmetric conflicts of 
interest between groups. When two groups each view the other as presenting a potential 
threat, but the inferred threats differ, I refer to this as a two-way asymmetric conflict. For 
example, if Group A values self-expression and Group B values obedience, Group A may 
see Group B as a threat to individual liberty, but Group B may see Group A as a threat to 
effective and efficient group coordination and functioning. So, in a two-way asymmetric 
conflict, each group views the other as a threat, but the threats each infers from the other 
differ. Contrast this with a one-way asymmetric conflict, where Group A views Group B 
as a threat, but Group B does not view Group A as a threat. For example, if Group A 
values pacifism, its members are motivated to avoid violence; if Group B values power, 
its members are motivated to dominate and control others. In this case, Group A may see 
Group B as a threat to individual liberty; Group A would see Group B’s values as 
incompatible with their own. In contrast, Group B may see Group A as presenting no 
threat, and perhaps even as presenting opportunities for dominance; thus, Group B would 
see Group A’s values as compatible with their own. 
 Asymmetric conflicts matter in that, though both groups may feel negatively 
toward one another, the specific emotions they feel toward one another may differ (e.g., 
Group A feels anger toward Group B, but Group B feels fear toward Group A). If their 
negative feelings toward one another differ, defusing the negativities between them may 
require the use of two differing strategies or interventions. So, whereas a traditional view 
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espouses that dissimilar values between groups lead to symmetrical intergroup negativity, 
my “conflict of interest” view suggests that certain value-dissimilarities (or similarities) 
between groups lead to specific (and not necessarily symmetrical) emotional reactions by 
each party, resulting in a wide variety of predictable and functional intergroup emotions 
(see Hypothesis IV). 
Prediction IV: Specific Value-Incompatibilities Predict Specific Prejudices 
Unlike previous work suggesting that inferred dissimilarities in values elicit 
general intergroup negativity, I suggest that values cue specific threats and opportunities, 
which elicit specific emotional reactions. Emotions are suites of coordinated cognitive 
and physiological processes that motivate organisms and direct their energy toward 
certain behaviors; they are functionally-specific in that they allow for the effective 
perception of threats and opportunities in one’s environment, while also guiding relevant 
behavioral responses to such affordances (Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 
2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). There are many discrete, basic emotions (e.g., anger, 
fear, disgust) that contribute to prejudices, each of which is elicited by certain types of 
events (Ekman, 1999; Neuberg et al., 2011; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg et al., 
2000). Here I briefly discuss those emotions that seem most relevant to anticipated 
intergroup relations. Certain emotions, such as shame, are more applicable to within-
group relations (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) and, therefore, are outside the 
scope of the current project. 
 Anger. Anger is elicited by inferred threats to one’s goals and interests; when 
actors evaluate situations as not reflecting their interests or meeting their needs, given 
their bargaining power, they feel angry (Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014). Given that I am 
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conceptualizing conflicts of interest as the hindering of one another’s goals, and that 
obstacles to one’s goals elicit anger, anger will be elicited in all conflicts of interest. So, 
in symmetric conflicts of interest and two-way asymmetric conflicts of interest, both 
groups will feel anger; in one-way asymmetric conflicts of interest, only the group whose 
goals are being hindered will feel anger. 
 Fear. Fear is elicited by inferred threats to one’s security. Most directly, fear is 
about defending the self (and those in whom we are invested) from physical danger 
(Ohman & Mineka, 2001). However, fear may also be elicited by potential threats to 
one’s future well-being (e.g., loss of one’s home, loss of trust in one’s social group) 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Fear is sometimes distinguished from anxiety, with fear 
posited as the response to a clear, immediate, and certain threat, and anxiety as the 
response to an ambiguous, potential, or uncertain threat (Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 
2011). Given the focus of the current project on anticipated threats, I use the term “fear” 
to encompass the concepts of both fear and anxiety. Fear will be elicited by values that 
imply potential physical harm and/or loss of stability and predictability in everyday life. 
For example, to those who value obedience, others who value self-expression present a 
potential threat to the predictable functioning of the social group and are, therefore, a 
threat to their group’s sense of security (Neuberg et al., 2000).  
 Disgust. Disgust is elicited by a perceived threat to one’s physical health via 
pathogenic contamination or ingestion of toxins (Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011; 
Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). Disgust can also be elicited by moral 
violations—social acts inferred to be offensive, contaminating, and/or contagious (e.g., 
cheating) (Rozin et al., 1999; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Disgust will be elicited 
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by values that imply a lack of concern with cleanliness/purity and/or openness to 
experience, given that exploration can expose one to novel pathogens. Disgust may also 
be elicited by values that suggest potential moral contamination (i.e., values seen as anti-
social and easily transmittable). When contact with a potentially contaminating agent 
becomes unavoidable, groups who value purity may react by attempting to contain the 
threatening group (e.g., restricting their movement) or to force their participation in 
hygiene behaviors (Curtis et al., 2011); in both of these cases, the group concerned with 
purity restricts the liberties of the “disgusting” group. 
 Positive Emotions: Enthusiasm and Comfort. Theorizing about the 
functionality of discrete, positive emotions has received much less attention than discrete, 
negative emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; Shiota et al., 2014; Shiota et al., in press). 
However, when one group is inferred to offer special opportunities to the other, I believe 
this will elicit interest/enthusiasm (i.e., curiosity, wonder, excitement). 
Interest/enthusiasm is experienced when a situation is appraised as safe, but requiring 
attention or effort; interest motivates individuals to attend to their situation, to explore in 
order to learn new information, and to take risks (Fredrickson, 1998; Shiota et al., 2014). 
Enthusiasm will be elicited by values that imply highly desirable and attainable 
opportunities, rather than threats, and will motivate individuals to explore the source of 
the opportunity. 
However, when one group is inferred to not present threats to the other, but to 
also not present highly desirable, attainable opportunities, I predict this will elicit the 
positive emotion of comfort (if any emotion is elicited at all). Comfort is not a strong 
emotion, but is still positively valenced. Most specifically, I predict that, when faced with 
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neither threats nor opportunities, people will feel fairly neutral (i.e., neither negative nor 
positive emotions will be elicited). However, given the operating assumption that others 
may pose highly costly threats to us, when we come to the conclusion that others do not 
appear to pose threats, individuals may report feeling comforted or at ease. To 
summarize, when one group perceives another as presenting potential opportunities, 
regardless of whether the other group also presents threats, this may elicit mild 
enthusiasm; when one group perceives another as presenting a lack of threat(s), 
regardless of whether the group also presents opportunities, this may elicit comfort. 
Mixed Emotions. I further suggest that a group’s values may elicit a mix of 
emotions. For example, to a group that values openness to experience, a group that values 
purity may present a potential threat to individual liberty, but may also present the 
potential opportunity of access to clean, disease-free mates. This suggestion that a single 
value may elicit both specific negative and positive emotions is an especially important 
departure from traditional theorizing, which suggests that dissimilar values across groups 
lead only to intergroup negativity. Indeed, conflicting goals (e.g., Group A wanting to 
both pursue opportunities presented by Group B while avoiding threats presented by 
Group B) are a potent source of emotional ambivalence (Berrios, Totterdell, & Kellett, 
2014). Furthermore, my perspective predicts that, when faced with conflicts of interest, 
groups may also experience negative/negative ambivalences (e.g., experiencing both 
disgust and anger). My conceptualization of values as cues to perceived incompatibilities 
and conflicts of interest that elicit specific emotional reactions allows for more nuanced 
predictions concerning prejudices than does the traditional view of dissimilar values 
eliciting general negativity. 
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The Current Study 
 The current study seeks to expand our understanding of the values-prejudice 
relationship by testing, through three hypotheses, whether cross-group value-dissimilarity 
or value-incompatibility drives intergroup negativities. 
Hypothesis 1: Across groups, values that are incompatible (regardless of whether 
they are similar or dissimilar) will elicit negative prejudices, whereas values that are 
compatible (regardless of whether they are similar or dissimilar) will not elicit negative 
prejudices (see Figure 3). 
Hypothesis 2: Different forms of value (in)compatibilities will elicit qualitatively 
distinct emotional reactions, rather than simple general negativity; the emotional 
reactions elicited will reflect functional responses to the particular threats (or 
opportunities) cued by specific values. For example, to a group that values Purity (i.e., 
upholding standards of decency and sanctity), a group that values Hedonism (i.e., 
enjoying life and indulging themselves) may be seen as presenting a threat of 
contamination, which would most strongly elicit an emotional reaction of disgust (see 
Figure 4). Or, to a group that values Universalism (i.e., protecting the welfare of all 
people), a group that values Power (i.e., controlling other people) may be seen as 
presenting a threat of aggression or violence, which would most strongly elicit an 
emotional reaction of fear. 
Hypothesis 3: Whereas one group may see a value-pairing as incompatible, the 
other group may not; one would thus expect such pairings to lead to asymmetries in 
prejudices (i.e., Group A feels negatively toward Group B, but Group B feels positively 
toward Group A). For example, if Group A values Purity and Group B values Hedonism, 
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Group A may see Group B as behaving in ways that may spread disease (thus creating 
incompatibility and eliciting negativity), but Group B may actually see Group A as 
providing opportunities for clean resources (thus creating compatibility, at least from 
Group B’s perspective, and eliciting positivity). 
To test these three hypotheses, a study design must allow one to (1) classify the 
values of target groups as similar or dissimilar to a participants’ values (controlling for 
compatibility) and as compatible or incompatible to a participants’ values (controlling for 
similarity) (i.e., a 2 X 2 design), (2) include target-participant value-pairs hypothesized to 
elicit a range of specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust, enthusiasm), and 
(3) include target-participant value-pairs hypothesized to elicit symmetrical versus 
asymmetrical prejudices. 
  As a first step, I selected eight values for which certain pairings of these values 
would meet the above criteria. Seven of these were pulled most directly from Schwartz’s 
Theory of Basic Values (e.g., Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012) and one from 
Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Graham et al., 2011), 
although values of similar content are referenced across a diverse range of theories and 
frameworks regarding basic values, morals, and human motivations (e.g., Janoff-Bulman 
& Carnes, 2013; Kenrick et al., 2010b; Rai & Fiske, 2011). The eight values of interest 
are: 
(1) Purity (i.e., the belief that it is important to uphold standards of decency 
and sanctity and to avoid doing anything “unnatural”) 
(2) Hedonism (i.e., the belief that it is important to enjoy life and indulge 
oneself) 
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(3) Self-direction (i.e., the belief that it is important to think creatively and act 
independently) 
(4) Achievement (i.e., the belief that it is important to show one’s abilities and 
gain admiration for accomplishments) 
(5) Power (i.e., the belief that it is important to control people and resources) 
(6) Obedience (i.e., the belief that it is important to always follow the rules 
and avoid doing anything people would say is wrong; referred to as 
“Conformity” by Schwartz et al.) 
(7) Humility (i.e., the belief that it is important to be modest and satisfied with 
what one has) 
(8) Universalism (i.e., the belief that it is important to protect the welfare of 
all people and to tolerate and understand others). 
 
As seen in Table 1, configurations of these eight values were able to fill each of 
the four Similarity X Compatibility cells of interest: similar/compatible, 
similar/incompatible, dissimilar/compatible, dissimilar/incompatible. Furthermore, at 
least one of these value-pairings is predicted to elicit each of the emotional reactions of 
interest (anger, disgust, fear, comfort, enthusiasm) and to elicit asymmetrical prejudices 
(e.g., Universalism/Power versus Power/Universalism).  
To test my hypotheses, I conducted a single study in which participants provided 
their emotional reactions toward eight target groups, each defined by one of the values 
above. Then, participants reported the values of a social group with which they 
personally strongly identify. I then classified for each participant the target groups that, 
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for them, held similar versus dissimilar values, and compatible versus incompatible 
values, resulting in a 2 (Value-Similarity: similar versus dissimilar target values) x 2 
(Value-Compatibility: compatible versus incompatible target values) within-subjects 
design. This classification procedure enabled me to test my hypotheses regarding the 
effects of value-dissimilarity versus incompatibility on intergroup negativities 
(Hypothesis 1), the specific emotional reactions elicited by the target groups seen as 
posing different forms of values threats (Hypothesis 2), and the possibilities of 
(a)symmetries in values-based prejudices (Hypothesis 3). Support for these predictions 
would greatly enhance our understanding of values-based prejudices by extending and 
refining existing theories and perspectives. 
Methods 
Participants.  
Three-hundred and fifteen residents of the United States from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website were recruited for an “Attitudes Survey” on perceptions of 
social groups and participated for a small monetary payment (90 cents for a 20-25 minute 
study). Conservatively estimating a small effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.10), with a repeated-
measures 2 (Value-Similarity) x 2 (Value-Compatibility) design, and an anticipated 
moderate correlation between the repeated measures outcomes (r = .40), a sample size of 
165 would be required to detect effects at p < .05 with Power = .80. However, as is 
described later, I anticipated that the data from only a limited amount of participants 
would be included in the within-participant analyses, given that many participants may 
not have a value-pairing that falls into each of the four cells. As such, I significantly 
raised my targeted sample size. 
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 Of these 315 participants, 85 were excluded from the data set prior to analyses—9 
who failed to follow instructions (e.g., participants were instructed to select an important 
group identity, but some later reported in open-ended responses that the identity they 
selected was not important to them), 27 who took less than 3 minutes to complete the 
survey (median and modal time to take the survey were 16 minutes), and 49 participants 
who provided no data regarding their own group’s values, making it impossible to 
classify their values as similar/dissimilar to or compatible/incompatible with the target 
groups’ values. 
After these exclusions, potentially usable data from 230 participants were retained 
(95 males, 129 females, 6 missing demographic information; mean age = 36.76 years, SD 
= 12.47; 70.9% White or European American, 7.8% Black or African-American, 7.8% 
Asian or Asian-American, 4.3% Latino/a or Hispanic, 0.4% Native American, 0.4% 
Middle Eastern, and 4.8% Multiracial). 
Procedure, materials, and measures.  
First, participants rated their specific emotional reactions toward eight target 
groups (presented in a random order), each represented by descriptions reflecting one of 
eight values: Purity, Hedonism, Universalism, Power, Self-Direction, Obedience, 
Achievement, and Humility. Descriptions of the groups’ values were modified items 
from various Schwartz values questionnaires (e.g., the European Social Survey, Bilsky, 
Janik, & Schwartz, 2011; the Portrait Values Questionnaire 5X, Schwartz et al., 2012) 
and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). For example, the group 
representing Hedonism was described as “Enjoying life and indulging themselves are 
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important to members of this group. It is important to them that they have a good time.” 
See Appendix A for the full set of descriptions. 
For each target group, participants rated on 9-point scales how angry/mad, 
afraid/anxious, disgusted/sickened, comfortable/at ease, and enthusiastic/interested they 
felt toward the group (2 items for each of 5 emotion constructs); e.g., “How angry would 
you feel toward a group like this?” with a response scale of 1 = not at all to 9 = 
extremely. These are the emotional reactions about which I have specific predictions (see 
Table 1). For each target group, a composite score was computed for each of the five 
emotion constructs as the two items assessing each construct were significantly positively 
correlated with one another at p < .001: Anger (across the eight target groups, rs ranged 
from .77 to .86), Fear (rs ranged from .50 to .72), Disgust (rs ranged from .74 to .91), 
Comfort (rs ranged from .77 to .88), and Enthusiasm (rs ranged from .78 to .87). 
Participants also rated how generally positive (1 item) and negative (1 item) they felt 
toward each group (allowing for a test of a less differentiated approach) as well as how 
much they respect/admire (2 items) each group (to provide some additional positive 
emotions and to help distract from the emotions of primary interest). For each target 
group, the general negativity and general positivity (reverse-coded) items were averaged 
into a General Negativity composite score (across the eight target groups, rs ranged from 
.31 to .66, all significant at p < .001). For each target group, the respect and admiration 
items were also averaged into a Respect composite score (across the eight target groups, 
rs ranged from .70 to .90, all significant at p < .001). The 14 emotional reaction items 
were always presented with “How much would you like a group like this?” anchored as 
the first item, followed by the other 13 items in random order; by first reporting positive 
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feelings toward each target group, I felt that participants would feel greater freedom to 
subsequently report negative feelings.   
Furthermore, across the eight target groups, the four negative emotion composites 
(General Negativity, Anger, Disgust, and Fear) were strongly related to one another 
(Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .82 to .93) and the three positive emotion composites 
(Comfort, Enthusiasm, and Respect) were strongly related to one another (Cronbach’s 
alphas ranged from .89 to .96). As such, composite scores were computed for Overall 
Negativity (i.e., an average of the General Negativity, Anger, Disgust, and Fear 
composite scores) and Overall Positivity (i.e., an average of the Comfort, Enthusiasm, 
and Respect composite scores). With this array of outcome measures, analyses can 
examine effects on Overall Negativity, Overall Positivity, and/or the differentiated 
emotions (General Negativity, Anger, Disgust, Fear, Comfort, Enthusiasm, Respect).  
After rating emotional reactions toward each of the eight target groups, 
participants rank ordered these groups based on how much each elicits each of the seven 
emotions. For example, “Please rank the groups in terms of how angry you feel toward 
them, from the most angry (position 1) to the least angry (position 8).” Rank orders of 
emotional reactions were included in case Likert-ratings lacked sufficient variability to 
enable ANOVA analyses (i.e., strong ceilings and/or floors). 
Next, participants were asked to think about a social group (e.g., ethnic, religious, 
professional) to which they belong and strongly identify, and to think about the values of 
that group. Participants reported the group they chose (open-ended), followed by a 
“group identification” induction in which they briefly wrote about how this social identity 
is important in their everyday life, what they enjoy most about being a member of this 
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group, and how the values of this group are reflected in their choices and behaviors (see 
Appendix B for complete Group Identification Induction).2 
 Participants then reported the values of their social group. Again, these value 
items were modified from various Schwartz values questionnaires and the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (see Appendix C). Although participants rated both the target 
groups and their own group on the same subset of eight values, the items for the target 
groups’ values versus their own group’s values were worded slightly differently to avoid 
drawing attention to this overlap. The participant read eight descriptions (displayed in a 
random order) of their group—with each description focused on a single, dominant 
value—and rated how much they agree or disagree that the description represents their 
group (1 = strongly disagree to 8 = strongly agree); e.g., “To my group, it is important to 
always behave properly. We also believe it is important to do what we are told to do.” 
Immediately following rating each of these values, participants rank-ordered these 
descriptions as more or less representative of their group. Rank-orders of the participants’ 
group’s values were included to allow for easy and clear identification of the participants’ 
group’s most important values (this point elaborated upon later).  
                                                 
2 Coding of these open-ended responses for descriptive purposes revealed that eight 
categories seemed to well-represent these data: occupational/professional identities 
(23.5%; e.g., Teacher, co-workers, entrepreneurs), social club/hobby/activism identities 
(21.7%, e.g., skydivers, animal advocate, sci-fi nerd), religious identities (20.4%; e.g., 
Christian, atheist, church), ethnic/racial/national identities (14.8%; e.g., Black, Scottish), 
family role identities (7.0%; parent, stay at home mom), political identities (4.3%; e.g., 
Democrat, Libertarian), gender/sexual identities (2.2%; e.g., Women, LGBT), and 
“other” identities (6.1%; e.g., realist, 20-something). 
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Finally, participants provided brief demographic information (e.g., sex, age, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, political liberalism/conservatism) 
and rated how unclear/difficult/fatiguing they found the survey to be. 
Results and Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 
I hypothesized that greater cross-group value-incompatibility, but not value-
dissimilarity, predicts greater intergroup negativities. To test this, I had to, for each 
participant, (1) identify the values rated as “most representative” of his or her own group, 
and (2) identify the target groups whose values would constitute the cross-group value-
pairs about which I had predictions (i.e., code certain target groups as having similar 
versus dissimilar values and compatible versus incompatible values). Doing so allowed 
me to conduct a 2 (Value-Similarity: similar versus dissimilar values) X 2 (Value-
Compatibility: compatible versus incompatible values) within-subjects ANOVA on 
intergroup negativities. Given the complexity of this procedure, an illustrative example 
will accompany its explanation. 
Identifying participants’ most representative values. For each participant, I 
identified his or her group’s most representative values by (1) identifying the three values 
rank-ordered as the “most representative” and (2) ensuring that each of these was rated as 
a 5 or higher (slightly agree to strongly agree) on the 9-point scale of representativeness. 
If any of a participant’s top three rank-ordered values was rated at 4 or below (slightly 
disagree to strongly disagree) on the continuous ratings, these were not classified as 
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important values.3 4 5 See Table 2 for example. Selecting up to three most-representative 
values per participant, rather than a single most-representative value, increases the 
number of target-group ratings that could potentially be included, increasing the 
likelihood of a balanced design within each participant (i.e., at least one value-pair in 
each of the four cells). 
With regard to the values classified as most representative of the 230 participants’ 
groups, 138 (60.0%) rated Universalism as one of their group’s most representative 
values, followed by 109 (47.4%) for Self-Direction, 102 (44.3%) for Humility, 86 
(37.4%) for Hedonism, 78 (33.9%) for Obedience, 78 (33.9%) for Achievement, 52 
(22.6%) for Purity, and 29 (12.6%) for Power. 
Allocating value-pairs to the Value-Similarity X Value-Compatibility matrix.  
I then identified, for each participant, those target groups whose values fit into the 
predicted cells of the 2 (Similar, Dissimilar) X 2 (Compatible, Incompatible) matrix. For 
example, if a participant’s top three values were Obedience, Hedonism, and 
                                                 
3 Eleven participants provided continuous ratings of the representativeness of their 
group’s values, but failed to provide rank-order ratings. For these 11 participants, their 
top values were determined by using only the continuous ratings: Due to ties among the 
continuous ratings, the value(s) with the three to five highest “most representative” 
ratings (of 5+) using the continuous scale were coded as the most representative values. 
For only these 11 participants, up to five values may be coded as “top values”.  
 
4 For 43 participants, one of the three values rank-ordered as the most representative was 
rated at 4 or below on the continuous ratings, while values rank-ordered as the 4th or 5th 
most representative were rated as 5 or higher on the continuous ratings. In an effort to 
ensure that as many participants as possible had at least 3 representative, important 
values, in such cases, the value(s) rank-ordered as the 4th or 5th most representative was 
recoded as one of the top three most representative values. 
 
5 Participants could have reported that none of these values are particularly representative 
of their group; within the confines of this study, such participants were classified as 
having “no values”; only 1 participant was classified as such. 
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Achievement, he or she would have outcome data relevant to predictions concerning the 
participant-target value-pairs of Obedience/Obedience, Obedience/Purity, 
Obedience/Self-Direction, Hedonism/Hedonism, Hedonism/Purity, 
Achievement/Achievement, and Achievement/Humility (see Table 3). 
Importantly, for each participant, some target groups’ values will be left 
unclassified as I will be focusing my predictions (and analyses) on only those participant-
target value-pairs about which I have explicit predictions (see Table 3). Overall, I had 
predictions concerning six Dissimilar & Incompatible value-pairs, four Dissimilar & 
Compatible value-pairs, two Similar & Incompatible value-pairs, and six Similar & 
Compatible value-pairs. 
Unfortunately, even though selecting up to three participant values increases the 
likelihood of including at least one value-pair in each of the four cells, it also increases 
the chances of a conflict within the 4-cell design. Consider our example of a participant 
whose top three values are Obedience, Hedonism, and Achievement; we would allocate 
his or her ratings of the target groups bolded and italicized in Table 3 into the 4-cell 
design (see Table 4). 
Included in analyses would be the participant-target value-pairs of, among others, 
Hedonism/Purity (dissimilar/incompatible) and Obedience/Purity (dissimilar/compatible), 
causing ratings of the target group valuing Purity to be placed in both the 
dissimilar/incompatible cell and the dissimilar/compatible cell. This is a problem because 
placing the same outcome rating in two of the cells would cause the independent 
variables to become non-independent. When a participant’s values caused a conflict of 
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this nature, the value-pairs causing the conflict were excluded. Conflicts of this nature 
were rare (See Appendix D for full details regarding value-pair conflicts). 
This design possesses certain strengths, but also presents certain difficulties. One 
strength is that, theoretically, neither value-similarity/dissimilarity nor 
compatibility/incompatibility are confounded with a single specific participant value or 
target value, which allows for greater generalizability of the findings. Another strength is 
the within-subjects design, which allows for greater ability to detect experimental effects. 
However, within each participant, I may not achieve a balanced design (i.e., an even 
number of value-pairs representing each the four similarity/dissimilarity and 
compatibility/incompatibility cells). Issues of imbalance across the four cells were 
anticipated and were addressed by running a series of supplementary between-subjects 
analyses (described later), in addition to the focal within-subjects analyses. 
Creating scores within cells. For participants with more than one target rating 
per cell, ratings of all the target groups in the cell were averaged into a single score per 
outcome for that cell (see Table 5). Ultimately, each participant had either a single score 
or no score (i.e., missing data due to a lack of relevant value-pairs) for each outcome 
measure (Anger, Fear, Disgust, Comfort, Enthusiasm, Respect, General Negativity, 
Overall Negativity, and Overall Positivity) in each of the four cells. 
Within-subjects sample. Of the 230 participants, 220 (95.7%) were classified as 
having at least one Similar/Compatible value-pair to be included in analyses, 217 (94.3%) 
had at least one Dissimilar/Incompatible value-pair, 160 (69.6%) had at least one 
Dissimilar/Compatible value-pair, and 75 (32.6%) had at least one Similar/Incompatible 
value-pair. Sixty-six participants (28.7%) had at least one value-pair in each of the four 
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cells, making them eligible for inclusion in the within-subjects analyses. Given the small 
percentage of participants who qualified for inclusion in the within-subjects analyses, 
exploratory, supplementary between-subjects analyses were also conducted (described 
later). 
The overall sample of 230 and the within-subjects sample of 66 were fairly 
demographically similar (66 participants with 1 missing demographic information; 33 
male, 32 female; mean age = 33.82 years, SD = 10.55; 68.2% White or European 
American, 9.1% Black or African-American, 9.1% Asian or Asian-American, 6.1% 
Latino/a or Hispanic, and 6.1% Multiracial). However, the within-subjects sample 
appeared to differ from the overall sample with regard to the frequencies of the values 
rated as the most representative. Specifically, the within-subjects sample had a greater 
percentage of participants with Self-Direction, Power, and Achievement rated as top 
values and a smaller percentage of participants with Universalism, Obedience, Humility, 
and Purity rated as top values: 57 (86.4%) rated Achievement as one of their group’s 
most representative values, followed by 39 (59.1%) for Self-Direction, 33 (50.0%) for 
Universalism, 23 (34.8%) for Hedonism, 18 (27.3%) for Power, 17 (25.8%) for 
Obedience, 7 (10.6%) for Purity, and 6 (9.1%) for Humility. Such differences are 
important to keep in mind when considering the generalizability of the results of the 
within-subjects analyses.6 
                                                 
6 In addition, the within-subjects sample had a greater percentage of participants who 
selected an ethnic/racial/national identity and a smaller percentage of participants who 
selected a religious identity. Overall, the within-subjects sample was represented by 
occupational/professional identities (21.2%), social club/hobby/activism identities 
(22.7%), religious identities (9.1%), ethnic/racial/national identities (24.2%) family role 
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Within-subjects analyses. To assess the effects of value-similarity and value-
compatibility on intergroup negativities, I first conducted a 2 (Value-Similarity: Similar, 
Dissimilar) X 2 (Value-Compatibility: Compatible, Incompatible) within-subjects 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) on the outcome of Overall Negativity. This revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of Value-Similarity (F(1,65) = 3.73, p = .058, 95% CI: 
-0.01, 0.59, ηp2 = .05) such that dissimilar values (m = 3.05, s.e. = .15) elicited 
(marginally) more negativity than similar values (m = 2.76, s.e. = .16), and a strong, 
significant main effect of Value-Compatibility (F(1,65) = 74.32, p < .001, 95% CI: 1.06, 
1.70, ηp2 = .53) such that incompatible values (m = 3.60, s.e. = .15) elicited more 
negativity than compatible values (m = 2.22, s.e. = .16). However, these effects were 
modified by a significant Value-Similarity x Value-Compatibility interaction (F(1,65) = 
5.36, p = .024, ηp2 = .08; see Figure 5) such that compatible values elicited relatively little 
negativity regardless of whether they were similar or dissimilar (p = .955 based on 
pairwise comparisons, 95% CI: -0.22, 0.23), whereas incompatible values elicited even 
greater negativity when also dissimilar (p = .025, 95% CI: 0.08, 1.10). 
 These results lend general, but incomplete, support to my prediction. As 
predicted, I found a strong main effect of Value-Compatibility, but against predictions, I 
also found a marginally significant main effect of Value-Similarity and a significant 
Value-Similarity X Value-Compatibility interaction. However, the marginal main effect 
of Value-Similarity was quite small in effect size (ηp2 = .05) compared to the very large 
main effect of Value-Compatibility (ηp2 = .53). Furthermore, dissimilarity of values only 
                                                                                                                                                 
identities (9.1%), political identities (4.5%), gender/sexual identities (4.5%), and “other” 
identities (4.5%). 
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predicted increased intergroup negativities when values were also incompatible; when 
values are compatible, value-dissimilarity did not predict increased intergroup 
negativities. In sum, the within-subjects analyses revealed that, as predicted, Value-
Incompatibility strongly predicts intergroup negativity but, against predictions, Value-
Dissimilarity also predicts increased intergroup negativity, albeit only for values that are 
also incompatible.7 
Next, given that a relatively small proportion of participants from the full sample 
were included in the within-subjects analyses, I conducted exploratory, supplementary 
between-subjects analyses to examine whether the pattern of within-subjects findings 
would generalize when utilizing a larger and more representative sample. I conducted 
these exploratory, between-subjects analyses to err on the side of conservatism: given 
that the within-subjects analyses revealed possible effects of Value-Similarity (in contrast 
to my predictions), I wanted to conduct supplementary analyses that would provide a 
second method of detecting effects of Value-Similarity, if they existed in these data. 
Unlike the participants included in the within-subjects analysis, most participants 
had target-group ratings that fell into only one, two, or three of the four cells. As such, I 
conducted a series of iterative between-subjects analyses: in each iteration, for each of the 
four cells, a random selection of 50 participants who had a rating in that cell were 
selected to represent that cell (and no other cells), resulting in a sample of 200 for each 
iterative between-subjects analysis. Although drawing iterative samples of 200 from a 
total sample of 230 results in highly similar samples across iterations, the samples within 
                                                 
7 This pattern of results generalized across the specific emotion reactions; it was not 
limited to some subset of emotional reactions (see Appendix E).  
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each cell will vary across iterations because the same participant could be assigned to 
different cells across the iterations. 
There is one main drawback to this analysis: there will be less variability in the 
similar/incompatible cell than the other three cells (see footnote 9), limiting 
generalizability of the conclusions for that particular cell. However, the potential benefits 
of these analyses outweigh the costs. By increasing the sample size from 66 (from the 
within-subjects analysis) to 200, I enhance the generalizability of the findings: unlike the 
within-subjects analysis, in the between-subjects analyses, the samples can include 
participants who do not have Power or Achievement as one of their group’s top-three 
values. And, by ensuring an equivalent number of participants in each cell, the between-
subjects analyses maximize statistical power, allowing for the greatest chance of 
detecting effects. In sum, if I see consistent effects across the iterative between-subjects 
analyses, and these effects allow me to draw similar conclusions as the within-subjects 
analysis, I have greater confidence in my findings. Exploratory, iterative, between-
subjects analyses are not a perfect solution to address the limited sample of the within-
subjects analysis, but they can serve as a complement. 
 Between-subjects samples. For the supplementary between-subjects analyses, 
from my sample of 230 participants, I drew five samples of 200 participants (referred to 
as Iteration 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), each with 50 participants assigned to represent one of the 
four cells. By selecting 200 participants for each iteration, rather than using all 230 
participants, I would ensure that the samples across iterations varied slightly, while still 
maintaining a high degree of similarity to the overall sample of 230. And, by assigning an 
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equal number of participants to each of the four cells, I maximized my power to detect 
statistical effects. 
 I began by classifying each participant by whether he or she had a representative 
value-pair in each of the four cells (e.g., Has a similar/compatible value-pair? 0 = no, 1 = 
yes). Of my sample of 230 participants, 75 (32.6%) had at least one similar/incompatible 
value-pair, 160 (69.6%) had a dissimilar/compatible pair, 217 (94.3%) had a 
dissimilar/incompatible pair, and 220 (95.7%) had a similar/compatible pair. 
For each iteration, given that the subset of participants with a similar/incompatible 
pair was the most limited, I began by randomly selecting 50 of those 75 participants.8 
Next, excluding the 50 participants already selected, I randomly selected 50 participants 
who had at least one dissimilar/compatible pair (i.e., the next most-limited sample). 
Continuing on, excluding the 100 participants already selected for inclusion, I randomly 
selected 50 with a dissimilar/incompatible pair. Finally, excluding the 150 participants 
already selected for inclusion, I randomly selected 50 with a similar/compatible pair. 
Rather than conducting a single between-subjects analysis with the whole sample 
of 230, I conducted iterative between-subjects analyses for one main reason: many 
participants had at least one value-pair representing 2 or more of the 4 cells. As such, I 
felt it was necessary to draw multiple random samples to allow such participants to be 
categorized into different cells across the iterative analyses. This way, if I were to see 
consistent results across the iterative between-subjects analyses, I could draw more 
confident conclusions that results are due to experimental manipulations rather than 
                                                 
8 Each of the 75 participants was designated a random number from 1 to 75, then the 50 
participants with the lowest random numbers (1-50) were selected for inclusion in the 
analyses. 
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confounds due to sampling. Conducting five iterative analyses (versus four or six) was 
somewhat arbitrary; five iterations was selected a priori because, for participants who 
qualified to be assigned to multiple cells, five would allow sufficient opportunity for 
categorization into multiple cells. If results looked inconsistent across the five iterations, I 
could always conduct more iterations; but, if results looked consistent across five 
iterations, I could draw fairly confident conclusions about the pattern of findings.  
Each of the five iterative between-subjects samples were demographically similar 
to one another and to the overall sample, but differed slightly from the within-subjects 
sample, which was more evenly split between males and females (versus female-biased) 
and, on average, slightly younger. For demographic information of each of the five 
iterative between-subjects samples, as well as for the overall sample and the within-
subjects sample, see Table 6. 
Supplementary between-subjects analyses. Using the outcome of Overall 
Negativity, the results of the five iterations of the between-subjects analyses were 
consistent with each other, but varied slightly from the results of the within-subjects 
analyses. Table 7 presents the means, SDs, and ANOVA test values from both the within-
subject sample and each of the five between-subject samples. In general, across the five 
iterations, there were main effects of Value-Similarity, such that dissimilar values elicited 
more negativity than similar values; this effect was always significant at p ≤ .01, with ηp2 
ranging from .03 to .11. There were also consistent main effects of Value-Compatibility, 
such that incompatible values elicited greater negativity than compatible values; this 
effect was always significant at p < .001, and stronger than the main effect of similarity, 
with ηp2 ranging from .16 to .23. Finally, there were no significant Value-Similarity X 
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Value-Compatibility interactions, with p-values ranging from .142 to .949 and ηp2 
ranging from .00 to .01 (see Iteration 1 results in Figure 6). 
The results of the within-subjects analyses and the between-subjects analyses are 
consistent in some ways and inconsistent in others.9 Across both types of analyses, there 
were consistent main effects of Value-Compatibility such that incompatible values 
elicited more negativity than compatible values, and these effect sizes were generally 2-4 
times larger than those of Value-Similarity. Therefore, I can draw a confident conclusion 
that value-incompatibilities strongly predict intergroup negativities, more so than do 
value-dissimilarities. Furthermore, the means for incompatible values (similar and 
dissimilar) and the mean differences between these two cells were very similar across the 
within and between-subjects analyses. As such, I can draw a confident conclusion that 
dissimilar and incompatible values elicit greater negativity than similar and incompatible 
values. 
                                                 
9 When comparing results of the within-subjects analyses to the five iterative between-
subjects analyses, the results within certain cells are less likely to differ than those within 
other cells. Specifically, 66 of the 75 participants who had at least one 
similar/incompatible pair were included in the within-subjects analyses and a random 
selection of 50 of these 75 participants were included in the five iterative between-
subjects analyses; given the large overlap in these samples, the results of the within and 
between-subjects analyses within the similar/incompatible cell are likely to look fairly 
similar. In contrast, given the larger sample sizes for the other three cells, and that the 
participants selected for inclusion in the between-subjects analyses for the other three 
cells were unlikely to be those included in the within-subjects analyses, the results within 
the other three cells are more likely to vary across the within and between-subjects 
analyses. As such, consistent results across the within and between-subjects analyses, 
particularly within the dissimilar/compatible, dissimilar/incompatible, and 
similar/compatible cells, are unlikely to be due to overlaps in sampling and point more 
strongly toward systematic experimental effects. 
 
  36 
The results across sample types were most different for compatible values (similar 
and dissimilar). Whereas the within-subjects analyses revealed that dissimilarity had little 
predictive utility when in the context of compatible values, the between-subjects analyses 
revealed that dissimilarity did predict additional negativity when values were compatible.   
Overall, despite the fact that both the within-subjects analysis and the iterative 
between-subjects analyses had their respective weaknesses, theses analyses complement 
one another and tell a similar story. Taken together, the results from both types of 
analyses lend strong support to my prediction that value-incompatibility strongly predicts 
intergroup negativities, but mixed support to my prediction that, controlling for value-
incompatibility, value-dissimilarity does not predict intergroup negativities.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that, based on a target group’s values, participants will 
experience specific, affordance-relevant emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust); in 
other words, in different emotional reactions will be elicited by certain participant-value 
X target-value interactions. Hypothesis 3 predicts that intergroup feelings will sometimes 
be symmetrical, but sometimes asymmetrical, as a function of whether groups present 
potential threats (eliciting negativities) or opportunities (eliciting positivities) to one 
another. 
To test these hypotheses, I (1) classified participants based on the one value they 
reported as being the most representative of their group and (2) within these eight 
participant groups, tested whether the predicted patterns of specific emotional reactions, 
and of symmetrical versus asymmetrical responses—as presented in Table 1—were 
observed. 
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Sample. Almost the entire sample of 230 participants from Study 1 were included 
in these analyses, with the exception of 11 participants who failed to provide rank-orders 
of the representativeness of their own group’s values and 10 whose #1 rank-ordered value 
was not rated as “representative” using the continuous ratings. This resulted in a sample 
of 209 participants (88 males, 121 females; mean age = 37.38 years, SD = 12.63; 74.2% 
White or European American, 7.7% Black or African-American, 7.7% Asian or Asian-
American, 4.3% Latino/a or Hispanic, 0.5% Native American, 0.5% Middle Eastern, and 
4.3% Multiracial). 
Of the 209 participants, 19 (9.1%) reported that Purity was their group’s most 
representative value, 15 (7.2%) reported Hedonism, 70 (33.5%) reported Universalism, 8 
(3.8%) reported Power, 35 (16.75%) reported Self-Direction, 13 (6.2%) reported 
Obedience, 17 (8.1%) reported Achievement, and 32 (15.3%) reported Humility. Results 
for those participant groups with smaller sample sizes should be interpreted with caution. 
Analyses. First, to establish general support for my prediction that emotional 
reactions will be modified by a Participant-Value X Target-Value interaction, I conducted 
a 5 (Within-Subjects Emotional Reaction: Anger, Disgust, Fear, Comfort, Enthusiasm) X 
8 (Within-Subjects: Target Group) X 8 (Between-Subjects: Participant Group) mixed 
ANOVA, predicting a significant 3-way interaction such that one or two emotional 
reactions would be prevalent for each target group, and these would differ across the 
eight groups of participants. This 3-way interaction was significant (F(196,5572) = 2.54, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .08), but did not take the predicted form; rather than targets eliciting one 
or two specific negative and/or positive emotions, they tended to elicit either greater 
positive emotions (e.g., Comfort and Enthusiasm) than negative emotions (e.g., Anger, 
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Disgust, Fear), or greater negative than positive emotions, with large distinctions between 
the negative and positive emotions but a lack of distinction among the three negative 
emotions and among the two positive emotions (see Appendix F for Means and SD of the 
five emotional reactions for the 16 value-pairs of central interest).10 
Before moving forward, to confirm that the specific negative emotional reactions 
were not modified by a Participant Value X Target Value interaction, I conducted a 3 
(Within-Subjects Negative Emotions: Anger, Disgust, Fear) X 8 (Within-Subjects: Target 
Group) X 8 (Between-Subjects: Participant Group) mixed ANOVA, predicting a non-
significant 3-way interaction; this 3-way interaction was not significant, F(98,2786) = 
1.20, p = .158, ηp2 = .04.11 As such, for future analyses, I created a Specific Negativities 
composite (averaging together Anger, Disgust, and Fear; Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 
.82 to .93) for each of the eight target groups.12 
Similarly, to confirm that the positive emotional reactions were not modified by a 
Participant Value X Target Value interaction, I conducted a 2 (Within-Subjects Positive 
Emotions: Comfort, Enthusiasm) X 8 (Within-Subjects: Target Group) X 8 (Between-
Subjects: Participant Group) mixed ANOVA, predicting a non-significant 3-way 
                                                 
10 I also conducted these analyses controlling for levels of general negativity/positivity by 
adding General Negativity as a sixth emotional reaction; controlling for General 
Negativity did not significantly alter the pattern of results or my conclusions. 
  
11 p-values reported use a Greenhouse-Geisser correction as assumption of sphericity was 
violated. 
 
12 Given that Hypotheses 2 and 3 dealt with specific emotions, I created this composite of 
the specific negative emotions for which I had predictions (Anger, Disgust, and Fear); I 
did not use the Overall Negativity composite from the Hypothesis I analyses, as it 
averaged these specific emotions with General Negativity and General Positivity 
(reverse-coded). 
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interaction; in contrast, this 3-way interaction was significant, F(49,1400) = 1.53, p = 
.015, ηp2 = .05. However, given that I had few predictions where only comfort (but not 
enthusiasm) or only enthusiasm (but not comfort) would be elicited, and that these were 
highly correlated (rs ranged from .72 to 88, all significant at p < .001), I moved forward 
by creating a Specific Positivities composite (averaging together Comfort and 
Enthusiasm).13 Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities were significantly 
negatively correlated with one another at p < .01 (across the eight target groups, rs ranged 
from -.19 to -.44). 
Overall, these results do not demonstrate support for Hypothesis 2; participants 
did not report specific, functionally-relevant emotional reactions in response to different 
target groups. However, participants did demonstrate clear negativities and positivities 
toward the various target groups, and these reactions differed based on the participants’ 
own most representative value. To formally test whether general negative/positive 
attitudes are modified by a Participant-Value X Target-Value interaction, and whether 
these intergroup feelings are symmetrical or asymmetrical, I conducted a 2 (Within-
Subjects Emotion Valence: Specific Negativities, Specific Positivities) X 8 (Within-
Subjects: Target Group) X 8 (Between-Subjects: Participant Group) mixed ANOVA, 
predicting, and finding, a significant 3-way interaction (F(49,1400) = 2.85, p < .001, ηp2 
= .09). This was followed by a series of Emotion Valence (Specific Negativities versus 
                                                 
13 I used this composite, which averaged the specific positive emotions for which I had 
predictions (Comfort and Enthusiasm), rather than using the Overall Positivity composite, 
which included a positive emotion for which I had no predictions (Respect). 
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Specific Positivities) X Target Group within-subjects analyses within each of the eight 
participant groups (each defined by the participants’ group’s most representative value).14  
Universalism. For participants whose groups value Universalism (n = 70), I 
predicted (1) relative positivity toward targets who value Universalism (i.e., a compatible 
value) and (2) relative negativity toward targets who value Power (i.e., an incompatible 
value); these predictions were supported. For this 2 (Emotional Reaction: Specific 
Negativities, Specific Positivities) X 2 (Target Value: Universalism, Power) within-
subjects analysis, I found a significant main effect of Target Value (F(1,69) = 26.52, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .28) and a significant main effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,69) = 26.66, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .28), but these were both modified by a significant Target Value X Emotional 
Reaction interaction (F(1,69) = 400.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .85) such that (1) targets who 
value Universalism elicited more positivity than negativity (p < .001), (2) targets who 
value Power elicited more negativity than positivity (p < .001), and (3) targets who value 
Universalism elicited less negativity (p < .001) and more positivity (p < .001) than those 
who value Power; see Figure 7. 
Power. For participants whose groups value Power (n = 8), I predicted negativity 
toward targets who value both Power and Universalism (i.e., incompatible values). 
However, I also predicted that, to participants who value Power, targets who value 
                                                 
14 Given some of the extremely small sample sizes (e.g., n = 8 for Power), I investigated 
whether the patterns of results would generalize when I grouped participants based on 
whether each of the eight values was one of their three “most representative” values 
(using the full sample of 230), rather than their top-ranked value. The patterns of results 
were highly similar whether participants were classified based on their top-ranked value 
or one of their top-three values. The consistency of these results allows for stronger 
conclusions about their generalizability, despite some of the small sample sizes of the 
analyses reported. 
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Universalism may be seen as presenting certain opportunities (e.g., gain resources), 
resulting in ambivalent (i.e., positive and negative) and therefore, more relatively positive 
reactions. Overall, these predictions were supported, providing evidence in favor of an 
affordance-management interpretation. For this 2 (Emotional Reaction) X 2 (Target 
Value: Power, Universalism) within-subjects analysis, I found a significant main effect of 
Target Value (F(1,7) = 8.26, p = .024, ηp2 = .54) and a significant main effect of 
Emotional Reaction (F(1,7) = 13.81, p = .008, ηp2 = .66), but these were both modified by 
a significant Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction (F(1,7) = 10.05, p = .016, 
ηp2 = .59; see Figure 8) such that (1) targets who value Power elicited (marginally) more 
negativity than positivity (p = .074 based on pairwise comparisons), (2) targets who value 
Universalism elicited more positivity than negativity (p = .005), and (3) targets who value 
Power elicited more negativity (p = .035) and less positivity (p = .010) than those who 
value Universalism. 
Universalism/Power (a)symmetries. If prejudices between groups were driven 
solely by how (dis)similar the groups’ values were, we would expect to see symmetrical 
prejudices. In other words, from a “dissimilar values” perspective, if two groups have 
different values, we would expect them both to feel negatively toward one another. In 
contrast, an affordance-management perspective would predict that prejudices will 
sometimes be symmetrical, and other times asymmetrical, as a function of the degree of 
compatibility between the values. 
With regard to the intergroup values of Power and Universalism, if prejudices 
were symmetrical, we would see that participants who value Universalism feel negatively 
toward those who value Power, and participants who value Power also feel negatively 
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toward those who value Universalism. In contrast, we see evidence of asymmetrical 
prejudices. Whereas participants who value Universalism felt negatively toward those 
who value Power, participants who value Power felt positively toward those who value 
Universalism. These results provide strong evidence in favor of an affordance-
management interpretation and against a “similar values” interpretation. The asymmetries 
of feelings between these groups demonstrate the utility of an affordance-management 
perspective in understanding the role that value-incompatibilities play in intergroup 
relations. 
Achievement. For participants whose groups value Achievement (n = 17), I 
predicted (1) relative positivity toward targets who value Humility (i.e., a compatible 
value) and (2) relative negativity toward targets who value Achievement (i.e., an 
incompatible value); these predictions were supported. For this 2 (Emotional Reaction) X 
2 (Target Value: Achievement, Humility) within-subjects analysis, I found no main effect 
of Target Value (F(1,16) = 0.31, p = .588), but a significant main effect of Emotional 
Reaction (F(1,16) = 46.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .75) and a significant Target Value X 
Emotional Reaction interaction (F(1,16) = 8.21, p = .011, ηp2 = .34; see Figure 9) such 
that (1) both targets who value Achievement and Humility elicited (at least, marginally) 
greater positivity than negativity (respectively p = .073 and p < .001) but (2) targets who 
value Achievement elicited more negativity (p < .001) and (marginally) less positivity (p 
= .065) than those who value Humility. 
Humility. For participants whose group values Humility (n = 32), I predicted 
relative positivity toward targets who value both Humility and Achievement (i.e., 
compatible values); these predictions received mixed support. For this 2 (Emotional 
  43 
Reaction) X 2 (Target Value: Humility, Achievement) within-subjects analysis, I found a 
main effect of Target Value (F(1,31) = 6.51, p = .016, ηp2 = .17), and a significant main 
effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,31) = 87.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .74), and these main 
effects were both modified by a significant Target Value X Emotional Reaction 
interaction (F(1,31) = 45.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .60; see Figure 10) such that (1) targets who 
value both Humility and Achievement elicited more positivity than negativity 
(respectively, p < .001 and p = .043) and (2) targets who value Humility elicited less 
negativity (p < .001) and more positivity (p < .001) than those who value Achievement. 
Whereas the target group that values Humility elicited a relatively large amount of 
positivity from participants who value Humility (in line with predictions), the target 
group that values Achievement did not (in contrast to predictions). 
Achievement/Humility (a)symmetries. With regard to Achievement and 
Humility, a “similar values” approach would predict that those who value Achievement 
should feel negatively toward those who value Humility, and vice versa. Again, in 
contrast to these predictions, we see evidence of asymmetrical prejudices. Whereas 
participants who value Humility felt fairly neutral (i.e., neither strongly positively nor 
negatively) toward those who value Achievement, participants who value Achievement 
felt strongly positively toward those who value Humility. Again, these results provide 
evidence against a “similar values” interpretation, but mixed evidence in favor of an 
affordance-management interpretation. In line with affordance-management predictions, 
participants who value Achievement felt relatively positively toward a group with 
hypothesized compatible values (e.g., Humility) and more negatively toward a group with 
hypothesized incompatible values (e.g., Achievement). In contrast to predictions, 
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participants who value Humility felt very positively toward one group hypothesized to 
have compatible values (e.g., Humility), but less positively toward a second group 
hypothesized to have compatible values (e.g., Achievement). These results could be 
interpreted as providing evidence against an affordance-management interpretation, or 
might simply suggest that, to participants who value Humility, groups who value 
Achievement are seen as posing a threat (e.g., a threat to social cohesion). 
Purity. For participants whose group values Purity (n = 19), I predicted (1) 
relative positivity toward targets who value Purity and Obedience (i.e., compatible 
values) and (2) relative negativity toward targets who value Hedonism (i.e., an 
incompatible value); these predictions received mixed support. For this 2 (Emotional 
Reaction) X 3 (Target Value: Purity, Obedience, Hedonism) within-subjects analysis, I 
found a significant main effect of Target Value (F(2,36) = 3.68, p = .035, ηp2 = .17) and a 
significant main effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,18) = 58.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .76), but 
no significant Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction (F(2,36) = 2.07, p = .141, 
ηp2 = .10; see Figure 11) such that targets who value Purity, Obedience, and Hedonism all 
elicited more positivity than negativity (respectively, p < .001, p < .001, and p = .015). 
However, even though the Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction was not 
statistically significant, one of the pairwise comparisons reached statistical significance: 
targets who value Obedience elicited more positivity than targets who value Hedonism (p 
= .008). In line with predictions, targets who value Purity and Obedience elicited more 
positivity than negativity; in contrast to predictions, targets who value Hedonism also 
elicited more positivity than negativity, albeit less positivity than targets who value 
Obedience. Although results provide mixed evidence in favor of an affordance-
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management interpretation, they provide clear evidence against a “similar values” 
interpretation, given that target groups with both similar and dissimilar values were rated 
relatively positively. 
Hedonism. For participants whose group values Hedonism (n = 15), I predicted 
(1) relative positivity toward targets who value Hedonism (i.e., a compatible value) and 
(2) relative negativity (or, perhaps, negative/positive ambivalence) toward targets who 
value Purity (i.e., an incompatible value); these predictions were supported. For this 2 
(Emotional Reaction) X 2 (Target Value: Hedonism, Purity) within-subjects analysis, I 
found no main effect of Target Value (F(1,14) = 1.81, p = .200), but a significant main 
effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,14) = 14.37, p = .002, ηp2 = .51), and a significant 
Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction (F(1,14) = 8.70, p = .011, ηp2 = .38; see 
Figure 12) such that (1) targets who value Hedonism elicited more positivity than 
negativity (p < .001) whereas targets who value Purity elicited a relatively equal amount 
of positivity and negativity and (2) targets who value Hedonism elicited less negativity (p 
= .014) and more positivity (p = .019) than those who value Purity. 
Purity/Hedonism (a)symmetries. With regard to Purity and Hedonism, a “similar 
values” approach and an affordance-management approach would both predict 
symmetrical negativities. Given that those who value Hedonism pose threats to those who 
value Purity, and vice versa, I predicted that participants who value Hedonism should feel 
relatively negatively toward targets who value Purity, and participants who value Purity 
should feel relatively negatively toward targets who value Hedonism. These predictions 
received mixed support: participants who value Hedonism felt relatively negatively 
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toward targets who value Purity, but participants who value Purity did not feel especially 
negatively toward targets who value Hedonism. 
Obedience. For participants whose group values Obedience (n = 13), I predicted 
(1) relative positivity toward targets who value Obedience and Purity (i.e., compatible 
values) and (2) relative negativity toward targets who value Self-Direction (i.e., an 
incompatible value); these predictions received mixed support. For this 2 (Emotional 
Reaction) X 3 (Target Value: Obedience, Purity, Self-Direction) within-subjects analysis, 
I found no main effect of Target Value (F(2,24) = 1.63, p = .217) but a significant main 
effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,12) = 57.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .83) and a marginally 
significant Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction (F(2,24) = 2.66, p = .091, ηp2 
= .18; see Figure 13) such that targets who value Obedience, Purity, and Self-Direction 
all elicited more positivity than negativity (respectively, p < .001, p < .001, and p = .001). 
Furthermore, targets who value Self-Direction elicited marginally more positivity than 
targets who value Purity (p = .051). In line with predictions, targets who value Obedience 
and Purity elicited more positivity than negativity; in contrast to predictions, targets who 
value Self-Direction also elicited more positivity than negativity, and marginally more 
positivity than targets who value Purity. Although results provide mixed evidence in 
favor of an affordance-management interpretation, they provide clear evidence against a 
“similar values” interpretation, given that target groups with both similar and dissimilar 
values were rated relatively positively. 
 Self-Direction. For participants whose group values Self-Direction (n = 35), I 
predicted (1) relative positivity toward targets who value Self-Direction (i.e., a 
compatible value) and (2) relative negativity toward targets who value Obedience (i.e., an 
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incompatible value); these predictions were supported. For this 2 (Emotional Reaction) X 
2 (Target Value: Self-Direction, Obedience) within-subjects analysis, I found a 
significant main effect of Target Value (F(1,34) = 18.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .35), a 
significant main effect of Emotional Reaction (F(1,34) = 147.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .81), and 
a significant Target Value X Emotional Reaction interaction (F(1,34) = 25.67, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .43; see Figure 14) such that (1) targets who value Self-Direction and Obedience 
both elicited more positivity than negativity (respectively, p < .001 and p = .032) and (2) 
targets who value Self-Direction elicited less negativity (p = .001) and more positivity (p 
< .001) than those who value Obedience. 
Conclusions. Overall, my predictions concerning specific emotional reactions 
(e.g., anger, fear, disgust) as elicited by particular Participant Value X Target Value 
interactions (i.e., Hypothesis 2) were generally unsupported. Although participants 
demonstrated clear patterns differentiating between the negative emotional reactions and 
positive emotional reactions, there was a generally a lack of distinction among the three 
negative emotional reactions and two positive emotional reactions. However, when 
reframing my predictions in terms of generally negative/positive emotional reactions, 
many of my predictions were supported—groups that I predicted would elicit relative 
negativity generally did elicit relative negativity, and groups that I predicted would elicit 
relative positivity generally did elicit relative positivity. 
With regard to Hypothesis 3, whereas a “dissimilar values” approach to prejudices 
would predict symmetrical negativities between groups with dissimilar values, and 
symmetrical positivities between groups with similar values, the affordance-management 
approach predicts intergroup emotional reactions that are sometimes symmetrical and 
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sometimes asymmetrical, as related to the threats and opportunities groups are seen to 
pose to one another. Although the patterns of obtained results provided mixed evidence in 
favor of the affordance-management approach, there was strong evidence against a 
“dissimilar values” approach in that asymmetrical prejudices were evident. 
General Discussion 
A traditional approach to values-based prejudices would predict that groups 
possessing dissimilar values will feel negatively toward one another. In contrast, my 
approach predicts that incompatible values—regardless of whether they are similar or 
dissimilar—will drive intergroup negativities. I argue that, because groups’ values act as 
cues to their tangible goals and interests, a target group’s values can cue a potential 
conflict of interest between oneself and a target group; when groups possess values that I 
predict would cause a conflict of interest, I refer to these values as incompatible. 
Furthermore, I predicted that target groups’ values cue specific threats and opportunities 
to perceivers; in reaction to these inferred threats and opportunities, I also predicted that 
people will experience specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust) in response 
to others’ values, rather than simple general negativity. Finally, because the inferred 
threats that groups pose to one another are not always symmetric, I predicted that 
negativities between groups may be asymmetric, with Group A experiencing negativity 
toward Group B, even if Group B feels neutral or even positively toward Group A.  
Overall, I found strong support for my prediction that incompatible values elicit 
greater negativities than compatible values. These findings lend strong support to an 
affordance-management perspective of values-based prejudices. However, I also found 
evidence suggesting a small, inconsistent effect of value-similarity on intergroup 
  49 
negativities, such that dissimilar values elicited greater negativities than similar values, as 
well as mixed evidence suggesting a possible Value-Similarity X Value-Compatibility 
interaction. Although these results lend some support to a value-dissimilarity perspective 
of values-based prejudices, the effect of Value-Dissimilarity on intergroup negativities 
was consistently much weaker than the effect of Value-Incompatibility. 
Further contradicting the value-dissimilarity perspective, I found strong evidence 
demonstrating that certain similar values across groups (e.g., Group A and Group B both 
value Power) elicit strong negativities, whereas certain dissimilar values (e.g., Group A 
values Power and Group B values Universalism) elicit strong positivities, albeit 
asymmetrically. However, in opposition to my predictions, prejudices were not 
characterized by specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust); almost all groups 
elicited greater positive emotional reactions than negative, and emotional reactions were 
split along negative/positive lines, rather than being differentiated by specific negative 
and/or positive emotions. These results pose challenges to the affordance-management 
perspective. 
Finally, I also found evidence of asymmetrical prejudices between groups with 
certain values, providing further support in favor of an affordance-management 
perspective and contradicting a value-dissimilarity perspective (which would predict 
symmetrical prejudices). Overall, my findings provide strong evidence against a value-
dissimilarity interpretation of values-based prejudices, and stronger evidence in favor of 
an affordance-management interpretation of values-based prejudices. 
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Did I Fairly Test the Value-Dissimilarity Hypothesis? 
Although I found that value-incompatibility strongly predicted intergroup 
negativity, I also found unpredicted small main effects of and or/interactions with value-
dissimilarity. Why did I observe only small effects of value-dissimilarity on intergroup 
negativity? Is it possible that the weaker effects of value-dissimilarity on intergroup 
negativity are due simply to a weak manipulation of dissimilarity?  
Simultaneously with the current study, I conducted a supplementary study (see 
Appendix G for full methods, results, and discussion), the results of which suggest that 
my Value-Dissimilarity operationalization was not weak. Participants rated both the 
compatibility/incompatibility and the similarity/dissimilarity of the value-pairs of interest 
and, as intended, value-pairs hypothesized as similar were rated as significantly more 
similar than those hypothesized as dissimilar, and value-pairs hypothesized as compatible 
were rated as significantly more compatible than those hypothesized as incompatible. Of 
note, the Value-Similarity manipulation was actually stronger than the Value-
Compatibility manipulation. As such, the comparatively small observed effect of Value-
Dissimilarity on intergroup negativities cannot be well explained by a weak manipulation 
of Value-Dissimilarity compared to Value-Incompatibility. 
Why Was There an Effect of Value-Dissimilarity on Intergroup Negativity? 
Again, I argued that intergroup negativity is the result of inferred conflicts of 
interest (i.e., threats) between groups, as cued by other groups’ values. Furthermore, I 
argued that, in previous work, the observed effect of value-dissimilarity on intergroup 
negativities was likely due to the fact that value-dissimilarity can serve as a cue to value-
incompatibility, given that the similarity and compatibility of values are somewhat 
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confounded. In other words, in the absence of information about the content of another 
group’s values, the knowledge that their values are dissimilar to one’s own can serve as a 
semi-reliable cue to value-incompatibility. As such, I predicted that, when controlling for 
Value-Incompatibility, the effect of Value-Dissimilarity on intergroup negativity would 
disappear. 
Implicit in my argument was the assumption that, when the incompatibility of 
values can serve as a direct cue to potential threat(s), the dissimilarity of values would no 
longer serve as a cue to potential threat(s). This assumes, however, that value-
dissimilarity is a cue only to value incompatibility. Perhaps, however, value-dissimilarity 
implies multiple threats. Just as “Blackness” in the U.S. can serve as a cue both to 
outgroup coalitional status (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001) and to desperate home 
ecologies (Williams, Sng, & Neuberg, 2016)—both of which elicit negative stereotypes 
and prejudices—it may be that value-dissimilarity also cues an additional factor that can 
drive negative prejudices. One candidate for such a factor is familiarity. That is, if groups 
that possess dissimilar values are inferred to be unfamiliar, and unfamiliar groups elicit 
negative prejudices (Neuberg et al., 2011; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012), then dissimilar 
values—regardless of their compatibility or incompatibility—will have a causal effect on 
negative prejudices above and beyond its cue value for value-incompatibility. 
Why might dissimilarity cue unfamiliarity? Because we adopt values and attitudes 
from the cultures we are embedded in, and because we are more likely to seek out 
information (including others’ values and attitudes) consistent with our own existing 
beliefs, we are likely surrounded by people who more strongly share our values than 
those who are distant from us. Furthermore, many common attitudes are heritable, and 
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research demonstrates that attitude-similarity serves as a heuristic cue to kinship (Park & 
Schaller, 2004). In sum, close (and, therefore, familiar) people are more likely to be 
attitudinally-similar to us than are distant (and, therefore, unfamiliar) people. If my 
participants were inferring that groups with dissimilar values were also less familiar, the 
dissimilarity of the values may have had an indirect effect on increasing any inferred 
potential threat(s), resulting in dissimilar values—independent of value-compatibility—
eliciting more negativity than similar values. Indeed, researchers have found that (1) 
attitudinally-similar targets are inferred to be more familiar and (2) familiar targets elicit 
greater positivity than unfamiliar targets (Moreland & Zajonc, 1982). 
Moving forward, I can explore this possibility by examining whether participants 
report having more frequent contact with, or infer greater subjective familiarity with, 
groups who possess similar versus dissimilar values. If groups with dissimilar values are 
inferred to be less familiar, and if less familiar groups elicit greater negativity than 
familiar groups, I may have evidence for an indirect effect of value-dissimilarity on 
intergroup negativity through inferred unfamiliarity. 
Finally, there are other possible explanations of the observed effect of value-
dissimilarity on intergroup negativity. For example, although I focused on values as 
representations of groups’ desired goals and outcomes, many values encompass both 
desired outcomes and processes for achieving those outcomes. For example, in the 
current study, the value Achievement was described as, “Showing their abilities and 
ambition are important to members of this group. It is important to them that people 
admire their accomplishments.” Here, the goal is to be admired for one’s 
accomplishments via the process of demonstrating one’s abilities and ambition. As such, 
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value-similarity may suggest some aspect of shared behavioral processes across groups, 
even if the groups’ goals are incompatible, leading to a reduction in intergroup negativity. 
Alternatively, groups that share “process-values” may be less likely to engage in 
conflict, even if they hold negative feelings toward one another. For example, imagine 
two groups that both value Achievement, and both believe that the way to gain status and 
admiration is through a demonstration of physical strength and agility (e.g., a football 
match). The groups may not have warm feelings toward one another, but both will accept 
the outcome of the football match because they agreed to use the game as the deciding 
achievement-factor. In short, there would not be intergroup conflict outside the confines 
of the agreed-upon process. In this way, groups with similar (process) values may 
experience less conflict than groups with dissimilar values, even if the (goal) values are 
incompatible.  
Do Qualitatively Different Value-Incompatibilities Elicit Qualitatively Different 
Emotional Reactions? 
I predicted that participants would report specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, 
fear, disgust) toward target groups as a function of the potential threat(s) those groups 
were inferred to pose (i.e., Hypothesis 2). In contrast, participants did not report 
experiencing these specific emotional reactions—why? My methods were similar to those 
used in previous studies that found evidence for specific, threat-based emotional reactions 
(e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), so a methodological problem seems an unlikely 
explanation. 
However, previous studies that found evidence of specific intergroup emotions 
have all used real target groups (e.g., African-Americans) or target groups presenting 
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clear and immediate threats (e.g., thieves). Given that the target groups in my study were 
much more abstract, I may not have provided enough information about the groups to 
cause participants to infer specific threats. Unfortunately, I did not directly measure the 
inferred threats of the target groups, so the current data provide no means of testing this 
explanation. In future studies, I could directly measure the inferred threats of the target 
groups along with the specific emotional reactions to test whether inferred threats are 
mediating the relationship between target group values and specific emotional reactions. 
Or, I could use real groups (e.g., Fundamentalist-Christians) and have participants report, 
(1) the inferred values of those groups, (2) inferred threats of those groups, and (3) 
specific emotional reactions to the groups. In the future, by simultaneously manipulating 
or measuring every causal variable in the proposed chain, I could determine why my 
predictions concerning specific emotional reactions were not supported in the current 
study. 
A second possible explanation for the observed lack of specific emotional 
reactions is that, in contrast to my predictions, incompatible-values do not cue specific 
threats. In other words, rather than value-incompatibilities cuing specific threats that 
elicit specific emotional reactions, value-incompatibility—in general—may cue a broader 
general threat that elicits more generally negative attitudes. Given the strong connection 
between groups’ values and their norms, it is possible that the most prominent threat 
inferred from a target group with any type of incompatible values is one of social 
disorganization and non-coordination. In other words, if I know your values are 
incompatible with mine, I also know that our groups have very different ways of 
behaving in social and interpersonal interactions. So, even though your incompatible 
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values could suggest a multitude of threats, the overwhelmingly obvious threat is one of 
social disorganization. Indeed, people report strong anger and disgust toward target 
groups inferred to have dissimilar values, and anger and disgust make theoretical sense as 
the most prominent emotional reactions to the threat of incompatible social norms and 
social non-coordination (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). In sum, the observed lack of specific 
emotional reactions to groups with incompatible values may be the result of a more 
broadly operating mechanism. Again, in the future, by simultaneously manipulating 
and/or measuring (1) the inferred values of target groups, (2) the inferred threats of those 
groups, and (3) specific emotional reactions to those groups, I can examine evidence in 
favor of or opposition to the presence of a more general “values-threat” mechanism. 
How might one validate the findings from the current study? 
Although I found similar effects of Value-Incompatibility and Value-Dissimilarity 
on intergroup negativity across both a within-subjects analysis and a series of iterative 
between-subjects analyses, the between-subjects analyses were exploratory and the 
within-subjects analysis was limited in generalizability. As such, it would be wise to 
replicate these findings using a similar within-subjects methodology, but with a much 
larger and more representative sample. Doing so would also allow me to measure 
potential mediators of interest (e.g., inferred familiarity) along with the focal predictors 
and outcomes. 
I would also like to validate these findings experimentally. Ideally, I would 
randomly assign participants to rate groups that have values similar versus dissimilar and 
compatible versus incompatible to their own group’s values, but this presents certain 
difficulties. The main difficulty is that the similarity and compatibility of a group’s values 
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exist in the interaction between the target group’s values and the perceiver’s own group’s 
values. Although I can manipulate target group values, it is much more difficult to 
manipulate perceiver group values. I could attempt to prime certain values for my 
participants’ groups; for example, each participant could write a narrative about a time 
when the value of Power versus Universalism was important to his or her group. 
However, if the participant’s group does not, in actuality, hold a certain value strongly, I 
would have (at best) a weak manipulation and (at worst) a manipulation that may cause 
reactance. In short, although I can randomly assign participants’ groups to “have” certain 
values, I cannot control whether they will leave their pre-existing (and, potentially, 
conflicting) group values at the door. 
Hopefully, an experiment would allow me to control for certain factors that I was 
unable to control in the current quasi-experimental study. One such factor was the suite 
of inferences that participants made about the target groups. It is naïve to believe that 
participants’ feelings toward the target groups were the result of only the information 
presented about the target groups’ values; many participants may have inferred that the 
abstract target groups represented real groups (e.g., inferring that the group valuing 
Universalism was Buddhists) or that the target groups possessed a host of related 
values/attitudes (e.g., inferring that the group valuing Universalism also values 
environmentalism). It is possible that participants’ feelings toward the target groups may 
have been driven, in part, by these extraneous inferences. 
To control for this, a potential experiment could provide participants with a 
detailed description of a target group (including information about the groups’ 
demographic make-up, and typical attitudes and behaviors of group members) and 
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manipulate only information about the groups’ value(s). Given that participants have pre-
existing attitudes about real groups, an ideal experiment would use a made-up (but, 
realistic sounding) target group. Although such a design presents certain difficulties (e.g., 
creating believable, coherent descriptions of a made-up group), it would allow me to 
control for factors that may have partially driven the observed effects in the current study. 
What are the Implications for Conflict-Resolution Interventions? 
An affordance-management perspective suggests that values-based intergroup 
conflicts may benefit from specifically tailored interventions, as opposed to more 
traditional “one-size-fits-all” interventions. Traditional interventions focus on 
encouraging cooperation to achieve shared goals (Jackson, 2013), increasing direct or 
indirect positive contact between groups (Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011), teaching 
about the other’s culture and encouraging tolerance, and encouraging empathy through 
perspective-taking (Abrams, 2010). I predict that these types of interventions may be 
differentially productive depending on the values of the conflicting groups. My threat-
based approach also suggests avenues for de-escalating intergroup conflicts by leveraging 
the groups’ values in ways that both avoid exacerbation of intergroup negativities and 
encourage intergroup positivity.  
For example, if Fundamentalist-Christians value purity and gay men value 
openness to experience, meaning that Fundamentalist-Christians see gay men as a 
potential disease and moral-contamination threat, encouraging direct contact between the 
groups may exacerbate Fundamentalist-Christians’ disgust reaction toward gay men 
because direct contact increases the inferred likelihood of catching “gayness” and gay-
associated values (Filip-Crawford & Neuberg, 2016). In interactions between groups with 
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conflicting purity and openness values, encouraging direct intergroup contact may 
backfire, increasing rather than decreasing intergroup negativities. Similarly, encouraging 
tolerance may be successful for groups who already value tolerance (e.g., the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNESCO), but may be 
unsuccessful for groups who value tradition (e.g., the Traditional Values Coalition); for 
tradition-valuing groups, tolerance of other lifestyles may be seen as a threat to their 
group’s ability to effectively and efficiently coordinate social action. 
However, understanding the content of conflicting groups’ values may also 
provide opportunities for conflict-resolution. To do so, one may be able to reframe 
conflicting values as complementary. Returning to the tolerance versus tradition example, 
if tolerance could be reframed as traditional (e.g., “In the United States, our heritage is 
one of inclusion and acceptance of differences.”), this may mitigate the perceived conflict 
of interest between the groups. Additionally, one may be able to reframe “intractable” 
value-conflicts as resolvable tangible-conflicts. Again, from my perspective, conflicts of 
values actually represent competing goals and interests—in other words, value-conflicts 
are, at their core, tangible conflicts. Given that we know much about the processes 
involved in conflict over material resources (e.g., Realistic Group Conflict Theory; 
Jackson, 2013), we may be able to apply those principles to certain types of value-
conflicts, especially when values imply competition over limited resources (e.g., two 
groups both value Power). 
However, I urge caution in equating values with material goals, because groups 
sometimes think of their values as “sacred” (Tetlock, 2003; Atran & Ginges, 2012; Atran, 
Axelrod, & Davis, 2007). Sacred values, as opposed to secular values, are “those values 
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that a moral community treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes 
comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values” (p. 320, Tetlock, 
2003). In other words, sacred values are those that one would not trade for any amount of 
secular/material reward. This does not suggest, however, that people are incapable of 
making secular/sacred trade-offs; although “devotion to family” is seen by many as a 
sacred value, and the “pursuit of wealth” as a secular value, people still pursue wealth at 
the cost of time spent with their family. Such trade-offs suggest that many sacred values 
are, in fact, “pseudo-sacred” (Tetlock, 2003). 
If sacred values are, in actuality, pseudo-sacred, and if we can induce people to 
recognize the tangible goals and behaviors tied to their values, many seemingly 
intractable conflicts of “values” may be translated into tangible terms, providing avenues 
for successful conflict resolution. In support of this, researchers find that framing 
conflicts in terms of material interests causes people to see more common ground with an 
opposing party (Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harnick, & Scheepers, 2012). And, when 
expressing anger in negotiations, anger leads to retaliatory and escalatory behaviors when 
a conflict is framed as one of values, but de-escalation when a conflict is framed as one of 
material interests (Harnick & Van Kleef, 2012). Ultimately, framing a conflict as tangible 
or material, rather than as stemming from values, may help to resolve some intergroup 
conflicts. 
Conclusions 
My affordance-management perspective builds upon existing work regarding 
value-dissimilarity and intergroup negativity, extending and refining our understanding of 
intergroup values-based conflicts. Although value-dissimilarity appears to play a small 
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role in intergroup negativities, value-incompatibility plays a much larger role; by 
understanding symmetric and asymmetric value-incompatibilities, we can better predict 
which groups will feel negatively or positively toward one another. Reframing our 
understanding of values as cues to conflicts-of-interest between groups provides 
principles for understanding intergroup prejudices in more nuanced ways and suggests 
more specifically tailored and concrete methods for reducing intergroup hostilities. 
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Table 2. Example of selecting a participant’s top three values. 
Value 
Rank-Order 
(1 = most representative to 
8 = least representative) 
Likert-Rating 
(1 = strongly disagree 
that value is 
representative of group 
to 8 = strongly agree) 
Top 3 
Important 
Value? 
Obedience 1 7 Yes 
Hedonism 2 5 Yes 
Achievement 3 6 Yes 
Self-Direction 4 5 No 
Purity 5 4 No 
Power 6 5 No 
Humility 7 4 No 
Universalism 8 4 No 
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Table 3. Example of selecting participant-target value-pairs for inclusion in analyses. 
Participant Value Target Group Value 2 x 2 classification 
Purity Hedonism Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Hedonism Purity Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Universalism Power Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Power Universalism Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Self-direction Obedience Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Obedience Self-direction Dissimilar & Incompatible 
Achievement Humility Dissimilar & Compatible 
Humility Achievement Dissimilar & Compatible 
Purity Obedience Dissimilar & Compatible 
Obedience Purity Dissimilar & Compatible 
Power Power Similar & Incompatible 
Achievement Achievement Similar & Incompatible 
Purity Purity Similar & Compatible 
Hedonism Hedonism Similar & Compatible 
Universalism Universalism Similar & Compatible 
Self-Direction Self-Direction Similar & Compatible 
Obedience Obedience Similar & Compatible 
Humility Humility Similar & Compatible 
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Table 4. Example of allocating ratings of target groups to the 2 x 2 matrix. 
 Similar Dissimilar 
Compatible 
Obedience 
Hedonism 
Purity 
Humility 
Incompatible Achievement 
Self-direction 
Purity 
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Table 5. Example of averaging target-group ratings within cells. 
Ratings of 
General 
Negativity 
Similar Dissimilar 
Compatible 
Obedience m = 1.0 
Hedonism m = 3.0 
Humility m = 2.0 
Cell mean = 2.0 Cell mean = 2.0 
Incompatible 
Achievement m = 6.0 Self-direction m = 7.0 
Cell mean = 6.0 Cell mean = 7.0 
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Figure 1. Representation of peaceful, tolerant values. 
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Figure 2. Representation of aggressive, dominant values. 
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Figure 3. Predicted effects of value-similarity and value-compatibility on intergroup 
negativity. 
 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Similar Values Dissimilar Values
N
e
g
a
ti
v
it
y
<
--
L
e
ss
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
o
re
--
>
Compatible Values
Incompatible Values
  77 
 
Figure 4. Predicted effects of specific value-pairings on participants’ distinct emotional 
reactions toward targets. “P” represents the participant group’s most representative value; 
“T” represents the target group’s value. 
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Figure 5. Mean Overall Negativity toward target groups based on Value-Similarity and 
Value-Compatibility (within-subjects analysis). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 6. Mean Overall Negativity toward target groups based on Value-Similarity and 
Value-Compatibility (between-subjects analysis, Iteration 1). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Universalism and Power by participants whose group’s most representative value is 
Universalism. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 8. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Power and Universalism by participants whose group’s most representative value is 
Power. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 9. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Achievement and Humility by participants whose group’s most representative 
value is Achievement. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 10. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Humility and Achievement by participants whose group’s most representative 
value is Humility. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 11. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Purity, Obedience, and Hedonism by participants whose group’s most 
representative value is Purity. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 12. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Hedonism and Purity by participants whose group’s most representative value is 
Hedonism. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 13. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Obedience, Purity, and Self-Direction by participants whose group’s most 
representative value is Obedience. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 14. Mean Specific Negativities and Specific Positivities toward target groups who 
value Self-Direction and Obedience by participants whose group’s most representative 
value is Self-Direction. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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APPENDIX A 
EMOTIONAL REACTION RATINGS 
  89 
Participants will rate their emotional reactions toward, as well as reporting the amount of 
interdependent contact they have with, eight groups, each represented by a single, 
dominant value. Participants will see the descriptions of the eight targets, one at a time, in 
a random order. 
 
“On the following pages, we’ll ask about your impressions of eight groups. At the 
top of the page, you'll see a description of a group; at the bottom of the page, you'll 
answer questions about that group. 
We appreciate your honest answers to each question. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we are simply interested in your personal impressions. 
You will notice that some of the questions look similar to one another. However, 
each question is different from the others, so please read each carefully and consider 
them individually.” 
 
Modified items from the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz, 
2011), the Portrait Values Questionnaire 5X (Schwartz et al., 2012), and the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). 
 
1. Upholding standards of decency and sanctity is important to members of this 
group. It is important to them to avoid doing anything “unnatural,” even if nobody 
is harmed. [Purity] 
2. Enjoying life and indulging themselves are important to members of this group. It 
is important to them that they have a good time. [Hedonism] 
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3. Tolerating people’s differences and protecting the welfare of all people are 
important to members of this group. It is important to them to understand others, 
even when they disagree with them. [Universalism] 
4. Controlling other people is important to members of this group. It is important to 
them to have more resources than others. [Power] 
5. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to members of this group. It 
is important to them to make their own decisions about what they do. [Self 
Direction] 
6. Following the rules at all times, even when no one is watching, is important to 
members of this group. It is important to them to avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong. [Obedience] 
7. Showing their abilities and ambition are important to members of this group. It is 
important to them that people admire their accomplishments. [Achievement] 
8. Being satisfied with what they have is important to members of this group. It is 
important to them to be modest. [Humility] 
 
Response scale: 1 = not at all to 9 = extremely 
 
1. How much would you like a group like this? 
2. How angry would you feel toward a group like this? 
3. How comfortable would you feel around a group like this? 
4. How sickened would you feel toward a group like this? 
5. How mad would you feel toward a group like this? 
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6. How much would you dislike a group like this? 
7. How interested would you be in a group like this? 
8. How disgusted would you feel toward a group like this? 
9. How anxious would you feel around a group like this? 
10. How enthusiastic would you feel about a group like this? 
11. How much respect would you have for a group like this? 
12. How afraid would you feel around a group like this? 
13. How at ease would you feel around a group like this? 
14. How much admiration would you have for a group like this? 
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APPENDIX B 
GROUP IDENTIFICATION INDUCTION 
  93 
“Now, we would like for you to think about a social group you belong to and 
strongly identify with. In other words, think about a group for which being a member is 
an important part of your identity. 
This group could be an ethnic group (e.g., Latino/a), a religious group (e.g., 
Christian), an occupational or professional group (e.g., teacher), or any other type of 
social group (e.g., environmentalist). 
We also want you to think about the values of that group. So, please think about 
a group you strongly identify with and the values that this group has. 
In the box below, please type in the name of your group. [open-ended response]” 
 
“Please tell us a little bit more about your group, [GROUP NAME], by typing a 
few, brief sentences to answer each of the following questions. 
(1) How is being a member of your group important in your everyday life? 
(2) In what ways do your group’s values influence your choices and behaviors? 
(3) What do you enjoy most about being a member of your group?” 
 
** Responses to these questions were used to remove certain participants prior to 
analyses. For example, when participants said that the identity they selected was not 
important to them, they were excluded from analyses for failing to follow instructions. 
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94 APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRE OF OWN GROUP’S VALUES 
  95 
• Again, modified items from the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Bilsky, Janik, & 
Schwartz, 2011), the Portrait Values Questionnaire 5X (Schwartz et al., 2012), 
and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). 
• “We are interested in your group’s [GROUP NAME HERE] values. Next, you will 
see 8 potential descriptions of your group. Please indicate how strongly you agree 
or disagree that each description represents your group.” 
• Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = mostly disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 
4 = slightly disagree, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = somewhat agree, 7 = mostly agree, 8 
= strongly agree 
• After Likert-type responses, participants rank-ordered all the values; “Please rank 
the following descriptions from the one that is the most representative of your 
group (position 1) to the one that is the least representative of your group 
(position 8).”  
• To avoid order effects, the eight descriptions were displayed in a random order to 
each participant. 
 
1. To my group, it is important to maintain purity. We also believe it is important to 
act virtuously and avoid carnal passions. [Purity] 
2. To my group, it is important to do things that give us pleasure. We also believe it is 
important to have fun. [Hedonism] 
3. To my group, it is important to listen to people who are different from us. We also 
believe it is important that people throughout the world are treated equally and 
have equal opportunities in life. [Universalism] 
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4. To my group, it is important that others do what we say. We also believe it is 
important to have money and expensive things. [Power] 
5. To my group, it is important to be free and not depend on others. We also believe it 
is important to do things in our own original way. [Self Direction] 
6. To my group, it is important to always behave properly. We also believe it is 
important to do what we are told to do. [Obedience] 
7. To my group, it is important to be successful. We also believe it is important that 
people view us as competent and recognize our achievements. [Achievement] 
8. To my group, it is important to be humble and not draw attention to ourselves. We 
also believe it is important to ask only for what we need and nothing more. 
[Humility] 
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APPENDIX D 
VALUE-PAIR CONFLICTS 
  98 
Again, selecting up to 3 participant values increases the chances of a conflict 
within the 4-cell design, potentially leading to the same outcome rating being placed in 
two of the cells, causing the independent variables to become non-independent. When a 
participant’s values caused a conflict of this nature, the value-pairs causing the conflict 
were discarded. Conflicting value-pairs are listed here: 
1) For participants who value both Purity and Hedonism (n = 5), we must discard the 
value-pairs of: 
a) Purity/Purity and Hedonism/Purity, as including these would cause ratings of the 
target who values Purity to be placed in both the similar/compatible and 
dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
b) Hedonism/Hedonism and Purity/Hedonism, as including these would cause 
ratings of the target who values Hedonism to be placed in both the 
similar/compatible and dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
2) For participants who value both Purity and Obedience (n = 25), we must discard the 
value-pairs of: 
a) Purity/Purity and Obedience/Purity, as including these would cause ratings of the 
target who values Purity to be placed in both the similar/compatible and 
dissimilar/compatible cells. 
b) Obedience/Obedience and Purity/Obedience, as including these would cause 
ratings of the target who values Obedience to be placed in both the 
similar/compatible and dissimilar/compatible cells. 
3) For participants who value both Hedonism and Obedience (n = 13), we must discard 
the value-pairs of Hedonism/Purity and Obedience/Purity, as including these would 
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cause ratings of the target who values Purity to be placed in both the 
dissimilar/incompatible and dissimilar/compatible cells. 
4) For participants who value both Self-Direction and Obedience (n = 16), we must 
discard the value-pairs of: 
a) Self-Direction/Self-Direction and Obedience/Self-Direction, as including these 
would cause ratings of the target who values Self-Direction to be placed in both 
the similar/compatible and dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
b) Self-Direction/Obedience and Obedience/Obedience, as including these would 
cause ratings of the target who values Obedience to be placed in both the 
similar/compatible and dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
5) For participants who value both Self-Direction and Purity (n = 9), we must discard 
the value-pairs of Self-Direction/Obedience and Purity/Obedience, as including these 
would cause ratings of the target who values Obedience to be placed in both the 
dissimilar/incompatible and dissimilar/compatible cells. 
6) For participants who value both Power and Universalism (n = 6), we must discard the 
value-pairs of: 
a) Power/Power and Universalism/Power, as including these would cause ratings of 
the target who values Power to be placed in both the similar/incompatible and 
dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
b) Power/Universalism and Universalism/Universalism, as including these would 
cause ratings of the target who values Universalism to be placed in both the 
similar/compatible and dissimilar/incompatible cells. 
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7) For participants who value both Achievement and Humility (n = 17), we must discard 
the value-pairs of: 
a) Achievement/Achievement and Humility/Achievement, as including these would 
cause ratings of the target who values Achievement to be placed in both the 
similar/incompatible and dissimilar/compatible cells. 
b) Achievement/Humility and Humility/Humility, as including these would cause 
ratings of the target who values Humility to be placed in both the 
similar/compatible and dissimilar/compatible cells. 
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APPENDIX E 
DETAILED 2 X 2 X 4 ANALYSES 
  102 
Given the mixed support for my predictions, I wanted to investigate whether this 
pattern of findings generalized across the specific negative emotion reaction outcomes or 
whether this pattern was driven by some emotional reactions but not others. If the pattern 
was driven by certain emotional reactions, we would see a significant 3-way Value-
Similarity X Value-Compatibility X Emotional Reaction interaction (although, the small 
sample size hinders my ability to detect such effects). However, if the pattern generalizes 
across the negative emotion reaction outcomes, we would see a Value-Similarity X 
Value-Compatibility interaction, without these interacting with Emotional Reaction. 
I conducted a 2 (Value-Similarity: Similar, Dissimilar) X 2 (Value-Compatibility: 
Compatible, Incompatible) X 4 (Emotional Reaction: General Negativity, Anger, 
Disgust, Fear) within-subjects ANOVA. First, similar to the previous analysis, there was 
a significant Value-Similarity x Value-Compatibility interaction (F(1, 65) = 5.26, p = 
.025, ηp2 = .08) such that compatible values elicited relatively little negativity regardless 
of whether they were similar or dissimilar (p = .955 based on pairwise comparisons), but 
dissimilar and incompatible values elicited greater negativity than similar and 
incompatible values (p = .026). There was neither a significant Value-Similarity X 
Emotion interaction, nor a significant 3-way interaction, demonstrating that the pattern of 
results obtained using the Overall Negativity outcome generalizes across the specific 
emotion reactions, rather than being driven by a particular emotion. 
In addition to the effects mentioned above, this analysis revealed a marginally 
significant main effect of Value-Similarity (F(1, 65) = 3.66, p = .060, ηp2 = .05) such that 
dissimilar values (m = 3.05, s.e. = .15) elicited (marginally) more negativity than similar 
values (m = 2.76, s.e. = .16), and a strong significant main effect of Value-Compatibility 
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(F(1, 65) = 73.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .53) such that incompatible values (m = 3.60, s.e. = .15) 
elicited more negativity than compatible values (m = 2.22, s.e. = .16). In addition, there 
was a significant main effect of Emotional Reaction (F(3,195) = 46.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.42) such that ratings of General Negativity (m = 3.72, s.e. = .11) were higher than ratings 
of the other three emotions (each different from General Negativity at p < .001 based on 
pairwise comparisons), while ratings of the other three emotions did not significantly 
differ from one another (Anger m = 2.58, s.e. = .16; Disgust m = 2.56, s.e. = .16; Fear m = 
2.76, s.e. = .17). The main effects of Value-Compatibility and Emotional Reaction were 
modified by a 2-way interaction between these variables (F(3,195) = 15.18, p < .001, ηp2 
= .19) such that, within incompatible values, ratings of General Negativity were higher 
than ratings of the other three emotions (each different from General Negativity at p < 
.05), but the other three emotions did not differ from each other; however, within 
compatible values, each of these four emotions differed significantly from the others (at p 
< .05).  
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APPENDIX F 
MEANS AND SD FOR SPECIFIC EMOTIONAL REACTION ANALYSES 
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APPENDIX G 
SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY (DETAILED METHODS, RESULTS, AND 
DISCUSSION) 
  107 
The main purpose of the supplementary study was to provide alternative avenues 
for analysis of Hypothesis 1 (i.e., effects of value-similarity and compatibility on 
intergroup negativities) in case the data from the focal study lacked theoretical coherence. 
In short, in the supplementary study, participants rated the similarity/dissimilarity and 
compatibility/incompatibility of all of the value-pairs from Study 1. If the results 
concerning Hypothesis 1 from the focal study had failed to map onto my predictions, I 
could have used the data from the supplementary study to explore whether participants’ 
classifications of the value-pairs into the 2 (Similarity versus Dissimilarity) X 2 
(Compatibility versus Incompatibility) matrix mapped onto my classifications and, if 
participants’ classifications differed from mine, I could have further explored whether the 
results from the focal study mapped onto participants’ classifications. However, given 
that the Hypothesis 1 results were theoretically coherent, the data from the supplementary 
study served a more exploratory purpose, allowing for (1) an examination of lay 
understandings of value-similarity and compatibility and (2) a data-driven exploration of 
my methodological assumptions. 
Procedure and Measures 
A second group of participants viewed the same eight descriptions of target 
groups as used in the focal study, but rather than rating emotional reactions toward the 
target groups, they rated the similarity/dissimilarity and compatibility/incompatibility of 
all the possible pairs of the eight values. With eight values, there are 36 potential non-
redundant pairs of values (see Appendix H), resulting in 36 similarity/dissimilarity 
ratings for each participant and 64 compatibility/incompatibility ratings for each 
participant (100 total ratings); the 64 compatibility/incompatibility ratings are a result of 
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the fact that the asymmetric value pairs (e.g., asymmetric Purity/Hedonism versus 
symmetric Purity/Purity) must be rated twice—for example, once asking how 
compatible/incompatible Hedonism values are to those who value Purity, and once asking 
how compatible/incompatible Purity values are to those who value Hedonism. 
 Before rating the value-pairs, participants learned about my conceptual 
distinctions between similar/dissimilar values and compatible/incompatible values (see 
Appendix I). At first, participants learned about only one of these distinctions (similarity 
or compatibility); then, they rated all the relevant value-pairs on the dimension they were 
exposed to. After this first set of ratings, participants learned about the other distinction, 
followed by rating the value-pairs on this second dimension. For example, if participants 
had first learned about and rated value-pairs for similarity/dissimilarity, they would then 
learn about and rate value-pairs for compatibility/incompatibility. Whether participants 
were first exposed to similarity/dissimilarity or compatibility/incompatibility was 
counter-balanced across participants. 
Having the participants learn about and rate targets for similarity and 
compatibility separately served a few purposes. First, this made for a cognitively simpler 
task; having participants rate each value-pair simultaneously as similar/dissimilar and 
compatible/incompatible would be fairly cognitively demanding, but having them rate 
each value-pair for similarity then compatibility (or vice versa) is much easier. Second, 
although I argue that value-similarity/dissimilarity and compatibility/incompatibility are 
potentially independent constructs, it is reasonable to assume that participants’ ratings of 
similarity and compatibility will be related, as these concepts are related in the lay 
lexicon. By having participants give separate ratings of similarity and compatibility, we 
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may better control for the pre-existing lay relationship between these concepts and 
encourage theoretical distinction of them. 
Participants provided continuous ratings (e.g., 1 = very similar to 6 = very 
different; 1 = very compatible to 6 = very incompatible) of value-similarity and 
compatibility. Continuous ratings (rather than dichotomous, e.g., similar OR different) 
allow for a better examination of participants’ inferences; participants may rate value-
similarity/dissimilarity and/or compatibility/incompatibility in a dichotomous manner 
(which would be evident by bi-modal responding rather than more normally distributed 
responding), or in a more continuous manner. A continuous-response scale allows for 
both possibilities. 
After the data were collected, similarly to the focal study, I created average scores 
of the outcome measures (Value-Similarity and Compatibility) for the 18 value-pairs for 
which I had predictions (see Table 1), resulting in a 2 (Hypothesized Similarity: Similar, 
Dissimilar) X 2 (Hypothesized Compatibility: Compatible, Incompatible) X 2 (Outcome 
Measure: Similarity, Compatibility) within-subjects design. 
Participants 
 One-hundred and forty-six residents of the United States recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website who participated for a small monetary payment were randomly 
assigned to the supplementary study. Originally, I aimed to gather data from 100 
participants: conservatively estimating a small effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.10), with a 
repeated-measures 2 (Hypothesized Similarity: Similar, Dissimilar) X 2 (Hypothesized 
Compatibility: Compatible, Incompatible) X 2 (Outcome Measure: Similarity, 
Compatibility) design, and an anticipated moderate correlation (r  = .50) between the 
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repeated measures outcomes, a sample size of 91 would be required to detect effects at p 
< .05 with Power = .80. 
 Of the 146 retained participants randomly assigned to the supplementary study, 7 
were excluded from the data set before analyses began because they took less than 4 
minutes to complete the survey (median survey time = 18.00 minutes and average survey 
time = 20.58 minutes). After these exclusions, potentially usable data from 139 
participants (23 with missing demographic information, 116 with complete demographic 
information reported here; 63 males, 53 females; mean age = 34.49 years, SD = 11.73; 
77.6% White or European American, 6.9% Black or African-American, 5.2% Latino/a or 
Hispanic, 2.6% Asian or Asian-American, 0.9% Native American, 0.9% Middle Eastern, 
and 6.0% Multiracial) were retained. 
Predictions, Results, and Discussion 
Lay understanding of value-similarity and value-compatibility. For the 18 
value-pairs for which I had predictions, ratings of the Similarity and Compatibility of 
pairs of the same values (e.g., Similarity of Purity/Hedonism with Compatibility of 
Purity/Hedonism, and Similarity of Hedonism/Purity with Compatibility of 
Hedonism/Purity) were always significantly positively correlated (at p < .01, rs ranging 
from .26 to .55), as were ratings of the Compatibility of pairs of the same values (e.g., 
Compatibility of Purity/Hedonism with Compatibility of Hedonism/Purity) (at p < .001, 
rs ranging from .45 to .71). This demonstrates that participants’ ratings of the Similarity 
and Compatibility of pairs of values are fairly non-independent, and ratings of inverse 
Compatibility pairs (e.g., Purity/Hedonism and Hedonism/Purity) are especially related. 
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In line with this, when classified as Similar versus Dissimilar and Compatible 
versus Incompatible using participants’ mean ratings (e.g., ratings of 1 = very similar to 3 
= slightly similar coded as 0 = similar; ratings of 4 = slightly dissimilar to 6 = very 
dissimilar coded as 1 = dissimilar; see Table 3), the 100 value-pairs were all classified as 
either Similar & Compatible or Dissimilar & Incompatible. Overall, in contrast to my 
theoretically-based predictions, participants’ ratings of the Similarity and Compatibility 
of the value-pairs were always highly related, resulting in none of the value-pairs of 
interest being classified as either Similar & Incompatible or Dissimilar & Compatible. 
These results suggest that value-similarity and compatibility may be confounded in the 
existing literature because lay understandings of these concepts are highly related. 
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 Exploration of methodological assumptions of Hypothesis 1. Given that the 
Hypothesis 1 results revealed small main effects of Value-Similarity on intergroup 
negativities, large main effects of Value-Compatibility, and mixed results regarding a 
Value-Similarity X Value-Compatibility interaction, I wanted to explore the strength of 
my Value-Similarity and Value-Compatibility manipulations using participants’ ratings 
of the Similarity and Compatibility of the 18 value-pairs of interest. In other words, given 
that I found small, inconsistent effects of Value-Similarity, but that the existing literature 
would predict larger and/or consistent effects, I wanted to explore whether the lack of 
consistent Value-Similarity effects could be explained by a weak manipulation. In short, I 
wanted to explore whether those value-pairs that I hypothesized to be similar were rated 
as more similar than those I hypothesized to be dissimilar, and whether those value-pairs 
that I hypothesized to be compatible were rated as more compatible than those 
hypothesized to be incompatible. Although participants’ ratings of the similarity and 
compatibility of the value-pairs were strongly related, and despite the fact that 
participants’ 2 X 2 classifications did not map onto mine, they may still have rated the 
value-pairs differently on the dimensions of similarity and/or compatibility. 
To explore whether participants’ ratings of the value-pairs would support my 
methodological assumptions from Study 1, I conducted a 2 (Hypothesized Similarity: 
Similar, Dissimilar) X 2 (Hypothesized Compatibility: Compatible, Incompatible) X 2 
(Outcome Measure: Similarity, Compatibility) repeated measures ANOVA. If 
participants’ ratings of the Similarity and Compatibility of the 18 value-pairs of interest 
were in line with my predictions, we would predict that (1) Similar value-pairs will be 
rated as significantly more similar than Dissimilar value-pairs (i.e., a 2-way Hypothesized 
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Similarity X Outcome Measure interaction of the predicted form) and (2) Compatible 
value-pairs will be rated as significantly more compatible than Incompatible value-pairs 
(i.e., a 2-way Hypothesized Compatibility X Outcome Measure interaction of the 
predicted form). 
First, in line with predictions, value-pairs hypothesized as similar (m = 1.51, S.E. 
= .10) were rated as significantly more similar than those hypothesized as dissimilar (m = 
4.11, S.E. = .06; mean difference = 2.60, p < .001 based on pairwise comparisons). And, 
value-pairs hypothesized as compatible (m = 2.46, S.E. = .08) were rated as significantly 
more compatible than those hypothesized as incompatible (m = 3.19, S.E. = .07; mean 
difference = 0.73, p < .001). As such, I was well suited to detect main effects of Value-
Similarity and Value-Compatibility on intergroup negativities, especially when using a 
within-subjects design that allows for greater power to detect experimental effects. 
Furthermore, the effect of Hypothesized Similarity on ratings of Similarity is much larger 
than the effect of Hypothesized Compatibility on ratings of Compatibility. If anything, 
this would imply that I was well suited to find a main effect of Value-Similarity on 
intergroup negativities (if one existed), and less well suited to find a main effect of 
Value-Compatibility. As such, the fact that we found a large, consistent main effect of 
Value-Compatibility coupled with a small and inconsistent main effect of Value-
Similarity enhances my confidence in my conclusion that Value-Incompatibility affects 
intergroup negativities more so than does Value-Dissimilarity. 
Results further indicated a significant Hypothesized Similarity X Outcome 
Measure interaction (F(1,117) = 18.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .14) , but no significant 
Hypothesized Compatibility X Outcome Measure interaction (F(1,117) = 0.09, p = .769). 
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However, the significant Hypothesized Similarity X Outcome Measure interaction was 
further modified by a significant Hypothesized Similarity X Hypothesized Compatibility 
X Outcome Measure interaction (F(1,117) = 5.53, p = .020, ηp2 = .05; see Figure A1) 
such that Similar & Compatible value-pairs and Similar & Incompatible value-pairs were 
rated nearly identically (as both highly similar and highly compatible) to one another, 
Dissimilar & Compatible value-pairs were rated as moderately dissimilar and moderately 
incompatible, and Dissimilar & Incompatible value-pairs were rated as strongly 
dissimilar and strongly incompatible. This 3-way interaction reflects the fact that my 
hypothesized “independent” variables (i.e., Value-Similarity and Value-Compatibility) 
were highly confounded, at least when examining lay ratings of value-similarity and 
compatibility. 
 
 
Figure A1. Similarity and Compatibility outcome ratings for the supplementary study. 
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To conclude, I am hesitant to draw strong conclusions based on participants’ 
ratings of Similarity and Compatibility given that the Hypothesis 1 results are 
theoretically coherent. However, there are two important conclusions to draw from the 
results of the supplementary study. First, participants’ ratings of the Similarity and 
Compatibility of cross-group value-pairs were highly confounded, suggesting that 
confounding of these concepts in the existing literature may reflect lay understandings of 
these concepts. Second, the Hypothesis 1 results (particularly, the lack of a consistent 
Value-Similarity effect on intergroup negativities) do not appear to be the result of a 
weak manipulation of Value-Similarity. If anything, my manipulation of Value-Similarity 
was stronger than that of Value-Compatibility, yet I found consistent, strong effects of 
Value-Compatibility on intergroup negativities and inconsistent, weak effects of Value-
Similarity. Overall, although participants’ ratings of the Similarity and Compatibility of 
value-pairs were not perfectly aligned with my theoretically based predictions, I am still 
confident in the conclusions drawn from the results of the focal study. 
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APPENDIX H 
NON-REDUNDANT VALUE-PAIRS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 
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8 values: Purity, Hedonism, Universalism, Power, Self-direction, Obedience, 
Achievement, Humility 
 
**indicates pairing for which I have predictions (see Table 1) 
 
Participants rate pairs 1-36 on similarity/dissimilarity; they rate pairs 1-36 and 2a-35a on 
compatibility/incompatibility. 
 
1. Purity/Purity** 
2. Purity/Hedonism** (2a. Hedonism/Purity**) 
3. Purity/Universalism (3a. Universalism/Purity) 
4. Purity/Power (4a. Power/Purity) 
5. Purity/Self-direction (5a. Self-direction/Purity) 
6. Purity/Obedience** (6a. Obedience/Purity**) 
7. Purity/Achievement (7a. Achievement/Purity) 
8. Purity/Humility (8a. Humility/Purity) 
9. Hedonism/Hedonism** 
10. Hedonism/Universalism (10a. Universalism/Hedonism) 
11. Hedonism/Power (11a. Power/Hedonism) 
12. Hedonism/Self-direction (12a. Self-direction/Hedonism) 
13. Hedonism/Obedience (13a. Obedience/Hedonism) 
14. Hedonism/Achievement (14a. Achievement/Hedonism) 
15. Hedonism/Humility (15a. Humility/Hedonism) 
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16. Universalism/Universalism** 
17. Universalism/Power** (17a. Power/Universalism**) 
18. Universalism/Self-direction (18a. Self-direction/Universalism) 
19. Universalism/Obedience (19a. Obedience/Universalism) 
20. Universalism/Achievement (20a. Achievement/Universalism) 
21. Universalism/Humility (21a. Humility/Universalism) 
22. Power/Power** 
23. Power/Self-direction (23a. Self-direction/Power) 
24. Power/Obedience (24a. Obedience/Power) 
25. Power/Achievement (25a. Achievement/Power) 
26. Power/Humility (26a. Humility/Power) 
27. Self-direction/Self-direction** 
28. Self-direction/Obedience** (28a. Obedience/Self-direction**) 
29. Self-direction/Achievement (29a. Achievement/Self-direction) 
30. Self-direction/Humility (30a. Humility/Self-direction) 
31. Obedience/Obedience** 
32. Obedience/Achievement (32a. Achievement/Obedience) 
33. Obedience/Humility (33a. Humility/Obedience) 
34. Achievement/Achievement** 
35. Achievement/Humility** (35a. Humility/Achievement**) 
36. Humility/Humility** 
 
  
  120 
APPENDIX I 
MATERIALS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 
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Participants rated the similarity/dissimilarity and compatibility/incompatibility of 
all the pairs of the eight values of interest; the eight descriptions of groups’ values were 
items 1-8 of Appendix A. Participants rated “chunks” of values, with each chunk 
displayed in a random order. Specifically, on the top of the screen, participants saw a 
description of one group’s value (e.g., “Upholding standards of decency and sanctity is 
important to members of this group. It is important to them to avoid doing anything 
‘unnatural’, even if nobody is harmed”) and on the bottom of the screen they saw the 
descriptions of each of the potential values that could pair with the value on the top 
(excluding redundant pairs). Within each chunk, the “pairing” values on the bottom of the 
screen were displayed in random order. This chunking method was adopted to make the 
ratings cognitively simpler and less fatiguing for participants than simply seeing every 
value-pair in a random order. 
 
Similarity/Dissimilarity ratings: “On the following pages, you will be rating 
how similar or different certain pairs of things are. For example, imagine a squirrel. On a 
scale of 1 = very similar to 6 = very different, how similar (or different) is a chipmunk to 
a squirrel? How similar is a fox to a squirrel? How similar is a bluebird to a squirrel? 
Specifically, you will rate how similar or different the values of two groups are. 
Groups vary in their values, and some values are fairly similar to one another whereas 
others are fairly different from one another. 
For example, if one group values longer prison sentences for criminals and 
another group values increasing the number of police officers patrolling neighborhood 
streets, these groups’ values are fairly similar. However, if one group values longer 
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prison sentences for criminals and another group values reducing the number of police 
officers patrolling neighborhood streets, these groups’ values are fairly different. 
For 36 pairs of values, you will provide a rating of how similar or different two 
groups’ values are (1 = very similar, 2 = somewhat similar, 3 = slightly similar, 4 = 
slightly different, 5 = somewhat different, 6 = very different). 
On each page, you will see a different pair of values. Please pay close attention to 
the values at the top and the bottom of each page. 
There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest thoughts 
and impressions.” 
 
Compatibility/Incompatibility ratings: “On the following pages, you will be 
rating how compatible or incompatible certain pairs of things are. What do we mean by 
compatible and incompatible? 
Incompatible means “causes a conflict of interest” and compatible means “does 
NOT cause a conflict of interest.” 
A conflict of interest occurs when an individual or group acts in ways that hinder 
or interfere with others’ desired goals, outcomes, or behaviors. 
So, two parties are incompatible when they hinder or interfere with each others' 
desired goals, outcomes, or behaviors, but two parties are compatible when they do NOT 
hinder or interfere with each others' desired goals, outcomes, or behaviors. 
For example, imagine a squirrel and a bluebird. Squirrels and bluebirds don’t 
interfere with one another’s goals or outcomes (i.e., they don’t eat the same food, they 
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aren’t aggressive against one another, etc.). Squirrels and bluebirds are pretty compatible 
with each other. 
In contrast, imagine a squirrel and a fox. From the squirrel’s perspective, the fox 
poses a large conflict of interest because the fox wants to eat the squirrel but the squirrel 
doesn’t want to be eaten. From the squirrel’s perspective, the fox is very incompatible 
with the squirrel. 
Finally, imagine a squirrel and a chipmunk. From the squirrel’s perspective, the 
chipmunk also poses a conflict of interest because the chipmunk competes with the 
squirrel for resources like food and shelter. From the squirrel’s perspective, the chipmunk 
is also incompatible with the squirrel. 
Specifically, you will rate how compatible groups' values are to each other based 
on descriptions of the groups’ values. Groups vary in their values, and some values are 
compatible while others are incompatible. 
For example, from the perspective of a group that values gun-rights (i.e., is 
against limiting restrictions on firearm ownership), a group that values gun-control (i.e., 
is for increasing restrictions on firearm ownership) has incompatible values because the 
group that values gun-control may interfere with the desired goals and behaviors of the 
group that values gun-rights. 
However, from the perspective of a group that values gun-rights, a group that 
values increasing border patrols and protections has compatible values because the group 
that values increasing border protections would likely not interfere with the desired goals 
and behaviors of the group that values gun-rights. 
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For 64 pairs of values, you will provide a rating of how compatible or 
incompatible one group’s values are to another group (1 = very compatible, 2 = 
somewhat compatible, 3 = slightly compatible, 4 = slightly incompatible, 5 = somewhat 
incompatible, 6 = very incompatible). 
For each pair of groups’ values, one group will be labeled Group A (or B, C, 
etc.) and the other will be labeled Comparison Group. Please try to take the perspective 
of Group A (or B, etc.), and then rate the compatibility/incompatibility of the Comparison 
Group's value from Group A’s perspective. 
For example, recall the squirrel and the fox. Again, from the squirrel’s 
perspective, the fox is very incompatible because the fox wants to eat the squirrel but the 
squirrel doesn’t want to be eaten. 
On the other hand, from the fox’s perspective, the squirrel poses no conflict of 
interest because foxes like to eat meat and squirrels are meat. From the fox’s perspective, 
the squirrel is very compatible with the fox. 
So, when rating the compatibility/incompatibility of groups’ values, you will rate 
how compatible or incompatible the Comparison Group's value is from the perspective of 
Group A. 
On each page, you will see a different pair of values: one value from Group A (or 
B, C, etc.) at the top of the page, and one value from the Comparison Group at the bottom 
of the page. Please pay close attention to the values at the top and the bottom of each 
page. 
Please note that, at the top of each page, you will see a value for Group A through 
Group H (eight groups). However, you may not see these in alphabetical order. For 
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example, you may see Group D, followed by Group F, Group A, Group C, Group H, 
Group G, Group B, and Group E. 
Furthermore, for each Group A-H, you will rate eight comparison groups. So, you 
will see the value of Group A combined with one value, then another, then another, until 
you have rated eight Comparison Groups from Group A's perspective. Once you have 
made eight ratings, you will move onto the next group (e.g., Group B) and make eight 
more ratings. This will continue until you have made 64 ratings. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are interested in your honest thoughts and impressions.” 
 
 
